Why is Vietnam's Corruption Control in Privatization Ineffective? A Game Theoretic Explanation by NGUYEN THI MY HOA
 WHY IS VIETNAM'S CORRUPTION CONTROL IN PRIVATIZATION 
INEFFECTIVE?  








A THESIS SUBMITTED 




LEE KUAN YEW SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY 
 







I would like to thank Professors Ann M. Florini, Michael Howlett, Raul P. Lejano, Scott A. Fritzen and 





TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
 
 Summary 4 
 List of Tables and Figures 6 
1 Introduction 8 
2 Paradigm Shift Model by Peter Hall vs. Vietnam’s “Proactive Paradigm Shift” Shortcut 11 
 2.1. Paradigm Shift Model by Peter Hall 11 
 2.2. Vietnam's Proactive Paradigm Shift 34 
3 Analysis of Vietnam's "Proactive Paradigm Shift" by Application of Game Theory 44 
 3.1. The "Paradigm Choice" Game 45 
 3.2. The "Formulator - Implementer Interactions" Game 50 
 3.3. 2nd Game 4th Quarter: Corruption in SOE Equitization 59 
4 The "Proactive Paradigm Shift" Games in Vietnam's Anti-corruption Policy 67 
 4.1. Game-Theory-Based Models and Hypotheses 67 
 4.2. Vietnam’s Proactive Paradigm Shift in Anti-corruption Policy 69 
 4.3. 2nd Game 4th Quarter: Lack of Corruption Control in Healthcare Socialization 86 
5 Conclusion 91 
 Bibliography 94 









The reason why Vietnam is ineffective in its corruption control in privatization is explored in the bigger 
context of the issue: Vietnam’s paradigm shift in renovation policy and corruption control. Vietnam’s 
paradigm shift is in turn explored by analysis of public policy theories that have been developed and 
can be applied in other contexts (in the UK’s shift from Keynesianism to monetarism and in Hungary’s 
shift from central planning to the market economy via privatization). While paradigm shift in other 
contexts follow the pattern in the Paradigm Shift model by Peter Hall to go through 6 stages of (1) 
Paradigm Stability, (2) Anomaly, (3) Policy Experimentation, (4) Authority Fragmentation, (5) 
Contestation, and (6) Paradigm Institutionalization, Vietnam’s paradigm shift is a “short-cut” that 
omits the 4th and 5th stages. This thesis has developed a model of Proactive Paradigm Shift based on 
game theory and Hall’s Paradigm Shift model to explain policy making patterns in Vietnam in the 
paradigm shift towards a “socialist-oriented market economy” and in corruption control (the proactive 
shift is not an anomaly to Hall’s model but a Nash equilibrium given the payoffs in Vietnam’s settings). 
The two games of “Paradigm Choice” and “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” developed in the 
thesis provide a conceptual framework to understand the existence of corruption in State enterprise 
privatization in Vietnam in its “proactive paradigm shift” towards the market economy (the case of 
Player C’s strategy c2 at the probability of (1 – p) and Player D’s strategy d1 at probability p; 
probabilities of the two players are corresponding i.e. q = 1 – p). These two games are also useful in 
explaining Vietnam’s current paradigm shift in corruption control, with the applicability requirements 
tested via the lack of corruption control paradigm mainstreaming in healthcare privatization (showing 
that Player C does play the game with strategy c2 in some cases at a (1-p) probability that is not 0, as p 
is less than 1). The two games help to explain why Vietnam’s corruption control in privatization is 
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ineffective by providing the conceptual framework for the context of the problem of corruption in 
privatization – the broader view of the special paradigm shift pattern in Vietnam in its economic 
renovation and corruption control. The problem of corruption in privatization (as in the case of SOE 
equitization) and lack of corruption control in privatization (as in the case of healthcare socialization) 
are linked to the deviation of Vietnam’s 4-stage Proactive Paradigm Shift from Hall’s 6-stage Paradigm 
Shift model to avoid authority fragmentation and contestation. If the payoffs to the players involved in 
the games are kept at the current value, then slow gradual change is expected in Vietnam’s fight 
against corruption, similar to its long march towards a “socialist-oriented market economy”. This thesis 
shows that theories of public policy and game theory method are useful tools to understand public 
policy issues in many contexts, including a developing, transitional country like Vietnam. It also 
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Theories of public policy have been developed to a high level and used widely in policy analysis and 
research all over the world. Such theories have helped to explain many phenomena in public policy not 
only in the context of the countries that the scholars researched and used as empirical material 
sources to develop their theories, but also in others. The generalizability of these theories strengthens 
their applicability. However, certain contexts might be a challenge to the applicability of public policy 
theories while more and more research is being carried out to expand the empirical material bases for 
the theories. 
Vietnam is a case for testing the applicability of public policy research because of the numerous public 
policy problems it has and also because of the difference of its policy making style from those of other 
developing and/or transitional countries. This is not to mention what many scholars have pointed out 
about the gap in the public policy theories that are developed mainly in the OECD world that needs 
adjustment in the developing country context. 
Vietnam has been carrying out many reforms like many developing countries that are pursuing growth 
and development and like many transitional countries that are changing from central planning to 
market economies. However, Vietnam still maintains its one-party system and its socialist orientation, 
unlike the transitional countries that also began the reform process during the mid-1980s. In Vietnam's 
own policy research literature, the fact that Vietnam’s successful open-door and economic renovation 
policy was started and has been led by the Communist Party since the mid-1980s has been cited as the 
reason to maintain the one party system and the socialist orientation. Vietnam's government claims 
that they have a paradigm shift towards a market economy.  
Yet it should be noted that Vietnam’s so-called “socialist-oriented market economy” – the current 
paradigm guiding economic reform policy in Vietnam – is unique and cannot be categorized in policy 
research literature elsewhere. Also, the process of paradigm shift in Vietnam seems to be different 
from what has been predicted for other developing and/or transitional countries by current policy 
research literature. 
Recently, corruption control has become an important reform agenda beside economic reform. The 
Party elevated the corruption control reform as a paradigm shift in a manner similar to the way it 
started the economic renovation process. Vietnam’s Anti-corruption Law was adopted in 2005. Anti-
corruption policy has been incorporated into a number of policy sectors and in the process of making 
many policies.  
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How can Vietnam's pattern of paradigm shift, which is different from the pattern predicted by policy 
theories, be explained? How can game theory help to explain this paradigm shift? How will such 
explanation help to predict the outcome of Vietnam's corruption control battle? Will Vietnam succeed 
in its corruption control battle in the same manner it has steered away from the centrally planned 
economic policy? What problems might arise in that process? What can be learnt about the 
applicability of public policy theories in the context of Vietnam?  
This thesis answers these questions by, first, applying the paradigm shift model by Peter Hall and game 
theory analysis to explore the paradigm shift in the case of SOE privatization (equitization1) in Vietnam 
and explain the phenomenon of corruption in this equitization process. Second, using the game 
theoretic model developed in that paradigm shift analysis, this thesis develops some hypotheses about 
the paradigm shift in corruption control. Finally, this thesis uses the game theoretic model to analyze 
the policy formulation problem in paradigm shift in corruption control and test its implications in the 
socialization2 (partial privatization) of healthcare in Vietnam. 
The research question on why Vietnam’s corruption control in privatization is ineffective is explored in 
the bigger context of the issue - Vietnam’s paradigm shift in renovation policy and corruption control, 
using the method of model building from synthesizing Peter Hall’s model with game theoretic analysis. 
The thesis confirms that Peter Hall’s model, which was developed in the UK context, is applicable to 
explaining the shift from central planning to the market economy via privatization in Hungary, a 
country which was previously in the socialist bloc that Vietnam belongs to. However, Hall’s model 
seems to be unfit for explaining Vietnam’s shift towards the market economy paradigm until the thesis 
fills the gap by developing a model of “Proactive Paradigm Shift” based on game theory. Not only does 
this model fill the theoretical gap in Hall’s model3 but it also explains the existence of corruption in 
State enterprise privatization in Vietnam in its “proactive paradigm shift” towards the market 
economy4. The thesis then shows that the game theoretic models are also useful in explaining 
Vietnam’s current paradigm shift in corruption control. The applicability requirements of the models 
are tested via the lack of corruption control paradigm mainstreaming in healthcare privatization5. In 
                                                          
1
 Equitization is the translation of the Vietnamese word for privatization of enterprises.  
2
 Socialization is the translation of the Vietnamese word for partial privatization of units in healthcare, education, sports and 
culture. 
3
 The “short-cut” anomaly is explained by game theory: The proactive shift is not an anomaly to Hall’s model but a Nash 
equilibrium given the payoffs in Vietnam’s settings 
4
 Corruption in equitization is the case of Player C’s strategy c2 at the probability of (1 – p) and Player D’s strategy d1 at 
probability p; the probabilities of the two players’ strategies are corresponding i.e. q = 1 – p 
5
 It shows that Player C does play the game with strategy c2 in some cases at a (1-p) probability that is not 0, as p is less than 1 
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short, by applying game theory to fill the theoretical gap in Hall’s model in explaining the special 
paradigm shift pattern in Vietnam’s economic renovation and corruption control, the thesis explains 
why Vietnam’s corruption control in privatization is ineffective6. All in all, it is to be noted that the 
research methods used in this thesis are suitable to the exploration of the research question because 
game theoretic explanations offer linkages in applying theories that have been developed in the 
context of developed countries in the context of developing, transitional countries. 
The remaining part of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 (Paradigm Shift Model by Peter Hall 
vs. Vietnam’s “Proactive Paradigm Shift” Shortcut) will highlight the differences between the 
paradigm shift pattern predicted by Peter Hall’s model and Vietnam’s paradigm shift pattern. Peter 
Hall developed a model of paradigm shift consisting of 6 stages based on the empirical material from 
the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in macro-economic policy making in the UK in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. This 6-stage model is confirmed in the case of privatization in Hungary with the 
shift from central planning to the market economy paradigm. However, the paradigm shift towards the 
socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam in the case of SOE privatization undergoes only 4 stages 
in the 6 stages, skipping stages 4 and 5, as if it is a “shortcut”, an “anomaly” that cannot be explained 
by Hall’s paradigm shift model itself. 
In section 3 (Analysis of Vietnam's "Proactive Paradigm Shift" by Application of Game Theory), game 
theory is applied to explain the differences between Vietnam’s “proactive paradigm shift” and Hall’s 
paradigm shift model. The one-off game of “Paradigm Choice” explains Vietnam’s paradigm shift as a 
pure strategy solution to the game, i.e. a rational choice instead of an anomaly. The repeated 
“Formulator - Implementer Interactions” game predicts the problems in the implementation of the 
privatization process, including corruption. This game theoretic prediction is confirmed by actual cases 
of corruption in SOE equitization in Vietnam. 
Section 4 (The "Proactive Paradigm Shift" Games in Vietnam's Anti-corruption Policy) applies the 
game theoretic model developed in section 3 in analyzing the current paradigm shift in corruption 
control in Vietnam. The hypothesis in applying the second game of “Formulator - Implementer 
Interactions” is then tested and confirmed in the case of corruption control in healthcare socialization 
in Vietnam. 
                                                          
6
 Ineffective corruption control in privatization is explored in two cases that illustrate one of the two models that explain the 
whole paradigm shift pattern: The problem of corruption in privatization (as in the case of SOE equitization) and lack of 
corruption control in privatization (as in the case of healthcare socialization) are linked to the deviation of Vietnam’s 4-stage 
Proactive Paradigm Shift from Hall’s 6-stage Paradigm Shift model to avoid authority fragmentation and contestation. 
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The sections combined explain why Vietnam has corruption and ineffective corruption control in 
privatization in the cases of SOE equitization and healthcare socialization through the application of 
game theory with the focus on the 4th quarter of the second game model. The phenomena of 
corruption and corruption control in privatization are captured when the pattern of paradigm shifts in 
economic renovation and corruption control in Vietnam is compared to the pattern of paradigm shift 
modeled by Peter Hall and some other scholars. The approach of this thesis therefore explores the 
research question on the issue of ineffective corruption control from a broader theoretical viewpoint 
that it would be in the case of exploring policy options to inform policy makers/implementers in 
dealing with the issue (as in policy briefs, for example).  All in all, the game theoretic analysis of Hall’s 
model’s adaptation in the case of Vietnam fills a gap in public policy in explaining policy making in the 
context of a transitional Vietnam while explaining the problems in Vietnam’s corruption control in 
privatization. The contribution to the theories in public policy science in the approach of this thesis and 
the findings of the thesis would make the game-theory-based exploration of Vietnam’s ineffective 
corruption control in privatization as presented in the following sections a worthwhile research 
endeavour. 
 
2. Paradigm Shift Model by Peter Hall vs. Vietnam’s “Proactive Paradigm Shift” Shortcut 
2.1. Paradigm Shift Model by Peter Hall 
2.1.1. Overview of Hall's Model 
Policy paradigms represent a set of cognitive background assumptions that constrain action by limiting 
the range of alternatives that policy-making elites are likely to perceive as useful and worth 
considering.7  
According to Peter A. Hall8, M.S. de Vries9 and Michael Howlett, M. Ramesh and Anthony Perl10, the 
shift from one policy paradigm to another follows a pattern of change that can be modeled into six 
stages. 
                                                          
7
 Campbell, John L. (1998), “Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy”, Theory and Society, Vol.27, 
No.5, p.385 
8
 Hall, Peter A. (1992), “The Change from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and British Economic Policy in 
the 1970s.” In Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. and Longstreth, F., (eds.) (1992), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.90-114; and Hall, Peter A. (1993), “Policy Paradigms, Social 
Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain”, Comparative Politics, Vol.25 No.3, pp.275-296 
9
 De Vries, M.S. (2005), “Generations of Interactive Policy-Making in the Netherlands”, International Review of Administrative 




Figure 1: Six Stages of Policy Paradigm Shift – Hall’s Paradigm Shift Model 
 
In the first stage (Paradigm Stability), the dominant paradigm defines the scope of the policy 
environment, the questions and problems to be addressed and the instruments in the policy toolbox. 
The indicator of this stage is the dominant discourse of the policy paradigm and the causative factor is 
that the dominant policy paradigm is institutionalized and supported by the government.  
In the second stage (Accumulation of Anomalies), the stability of the dominant paradigm is challenged 
by the accumulation of anomalies caused by “real world developments” or exogenous factors which 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
10
 Howlett, Michael, Ramesh, M. and Perl, Anthony (2009), Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, Third 
Edition, Oxford University Press 
(1) 
















of New Paradigm 
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are neither anticipated nor comprehensible in the terms of the reigning paradigm. This stage is 
indicated by the emergence of critiques and questioning of the dominant policy paradigm.  
In the third stage (Policy Experimentation), the dominant paradigm attempts to explain and account 
for the anomalies through experimental and ad hoc policies, which weaken the overall coherence and 
precision of the paradigm. Efforts by politicians or administrators to adjust the dominant discourse 
lead to first order change (incrementalist, satisficing adjustment) and second order change (changes in 
policy instruments without changing policy goals).  
In the fourth stage (Fragmentation of Authority), the failure of the dominant paradigm to respond to 
or explain the accumulation of anomalies promotes the search for alternative ideas and opens up the 
policy debate to a wider range of actors. There is a lack of confidence in the principal authorities or a 
fragmentation of authority.  
In the fifth stage (Contestation), as the authority for policy is fragmented and alternative ideas enter 
the policy debate, the paradigms are contested politically and the fate of the alternative paradigm is 
determined by electoral and/or partisan considerations.  
In the final stage (Institutionalization of New Paradigm), if the alternative paradigm receives sufficient 
political support, it replaces the dominant paradigm and begins the process of institutionalization as 
new actors are brought into positions of power and the bureaucracy to implement the ideas of the 
new paradigm.  
According to this model, although initial steps towards policy change begin within the dominant old 
paradigm in the first place, failed attempts to solve policy problems using the old paradigm lead to the 
discrediting of the old paradigm. The new paradigm will replace the old paradigm through political 
contestation between/among those supporting different paradigms. 
Developed from case studies in Western settings, Hall’s Paradigm Shift model can explain the process 
of changing the framework guiding public policy in many cases. The illustrations that follow show the 
way in which this model explains the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in the UK in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s and the paradigm shift from central planning to market economy in 
transitional countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The test and confirmation of Hall’s model is 
through the case of state enterprise privatization in Hungary. It should be noted that the paradigm 
shifts in these cases are significant as the contesting theories that explain the operation of the 
economy differ to a large extent (Keynesianism vs. monetarism, central planning vs. market economy). 
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The policies based on the winning paradigms (monetarism, market economy) can deal with the 
anomalous problems (stagflation, economic inefficiency) that the old paradigm could not explain. 
 
2.1.2. Paradigm Shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism in the UK 
Keynesianism and monetarism have contrasting ways of explaining macroeconomic issues. According 
to Keynesianism, private economy is unstable, thus needs regular fiscal adjustment; and inflation is 
caused by cycles of real economy, excess wage and price pressure. According to monetarism, the 
private economy is stable while discretionary policy adversely affects the economy; and inflation is 
caused by changes in growth rate of money supply. Therefore, monetarism predicts that 
unemployment is not state responsibility. The policy advice following monetarism is totally in contrast 
to the policies based on Keynesianism, which encourages increasing government spending to reduce 
unemployment. The shift from Keynesianism to monetarism led to significant policy changes in the UK 
in the early 1980s. 
Table 1: Keynesian vs. Monetarism Paradigms 
 
British economic policy underwent a revolution in the 1970s, moving from a “Keynesian era” to a 
monetarist mode of economic policy making. The process of paradigm shift occurred through six 
Keynesianism Monetarism 
Private economy is unstable, thus needs 
regular fiscal adjustment  
Private economy is stable while discretionary 
policy is impediment to efficient economic 
performance  
Inflation is caused by cycles of real 
economy, excess wage and price pressure  
Inflation is caused by changes in growth rate 
of money supply  
Unemployment can be reduced by 
government through public consumption 
and investment  
Unemployment is not state responsibility and 
would converge on natural rate fixed by 
conditions in the labor market  
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stages, under different UK government regimes and became entrenched under Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher.  
 
2.1.2.1. Stage 1 – Paradigm Stability: [UK: Keynesianism] 
In the first stage, the dominant paradigm defines the scope of the policy environment, the questions 
and problems to be addressed and the instruments in the policy toolbox. The indicator of this stage is 
the dominant discourse of the policy paradigm and the causative factor is that the dominant policy 
paradigm is institutionalized and supported by the government. 
In the post-WWII period until the early 1970s, economic policy in the UK was based on Keynesianism, 
which placed priority on the use of fiscal policy strategies in dealing with economic problems. In 
Keynesianism, the state is the “balancer of economic fluctuations through the public sector. Public 
investment and consumption should be increased during periods of unemployment and depression to 
stimulate the economy, and cut back during boom periods to reduce inflationary tendencies.”11 This 
paradigm had been entrenched as a highly coherent system of ideas institutionalized into the British 
financial system, even in the operation of the Treasury. British policy makers followed this framework 
when viewing economic phenomena and problems, setting policy goals and choosing policy 
instruments.  
 
2.1.2.2. Stage 2 – Accumulation of Anomalies: [Stagflation]  
In the second stage, the stability of the dominant paradigm is challenged by the accumulation of 
anomalies caused by “real world developments” or exogenous factors which are neither anticipated nor 
comprehensible in the terms of the reigning paradigm. This stage is indicated by the emergence of 
critiques and questioning of the dominant policy paradigm. 
In 1971-72, the UK witnessed an economic anomaly – stagflation – which was not successfully dealt 
with on the basis of the Keynesian principles. While according to the hitherto macroeconomic theory, 
inflation and recession were regarded as mutually exclusive (i.e. high unemployment was typically 
                                                          
11
 Uusitalo, Paavo (1984) “Monetarism, Keynesianism and the Institutional Status of Central Banks”, Acta Sociologica, Vol.27, 
No.1, p. 38 
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associated with low inflation, and vice versa)12, what the UK underwent was an unstable relationship 
between inflation and unemployment – the levels of both unemployment and inflation were rising. 
However, British public policy was still influenced by Keynesianism in responding to the new 
phenomenon which was not fully explained by this prevailing paradigm. The 1970-74 Conservative 
government under Edward Heath responded to the stagflation with typical Keynesian policies of 
substantial increases in public spending, a relaxed monetary policy, a statutory income policy, and 
massive industrial subsidies, which was the opposite of what Heath promised before the election – 
reductions in public spending, lower levels of government involvement in the economy, and 
movement toward greater market competition. According to Hall, the seemingly new idea of Heath’s 
election platform was a “jelly built structure with no underpinning in an alternative economic theory”13 
(i.e. not a new paradigm) and the dominant framework for his government’s economic policy making 
was still Keynesianism. In 1973-74, the “anomaly” accumulated. The UK had rising levels of inflation 
and economic stagnation associated with the oil price shock of 1973-74. The new Labour government 
under Harold Wilson responded by a Keynesian policy of pumping money into the economy to 
counteract the effects of recession. Once more, the institutionalization of Keynesian policy paradigm 
preserved its dominance in the presence of the anomalous event of stagflation.  
 
2.1.2.3. Stage 3 – Policy Experimentation: [Non-Keynesian approaches, monetarist experiments] 
In the third stage, the dominant paradigm attempts to explain and account for the anomalies through 
experimental and ad hoc policies, which weaken the overall coherence and precision of the paradigm. 
Efforts by politicians or administrators to adjust the dominant discourse lead to first order change 
(incrementalist, satisficing adjustment) and second order change (changes in policy instruments 
without changing policy goals). 
In the UK, 1976 marked a critical stage in the movement of policy making towards monetarism. The 
new Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan acknowledged that a fiscal stimulus could no longer be 
used to counteract rising levels of unemployment. The government paid more attention to monetary 
targets and embarked on a hitherto deepest cut in public expenditure. The government’s austerity 
measures of 1976-77 seemed to have taken into account the market behavior input, besides the 
demand from the IMF and the impact of the trade union, among other institutional factors. 
                                                          
12
 Leeson, Robert (1998) “The Origins of the Keynesian Discomfiture”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol.20, No.4, pp. 
597-619 
13
 Hall (1993) p.290 
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Keynesianism had by then lost some of its conviction to politicians. However, according to Hall, “these 
policies did not yet represent full acceptance of the monetarist paradigm. They were ad-hoc measures 
taken in response to the collapse of Keynesian paradigm”.14 In other words, they were policy 
experimentation whereby UK policy makers made efforts to adjust British economic policy to cope 
with the new phenomenon and level of entrenchment of monetarism had not yet been intensive 
enough to make it recognized as a new paradigm. 
 
2.1.2.4. Stage 4 – Fragmentation of Authority: [Keynesianism losing impact] 
In the fourth stage, the failure of the dominant paradigm to respond to or explain the accumulation of 
anomalies promotes the search for alternative ideas and opens up the policy debate to a wider range of 
actors. There is a lack of confidence in the principal authorities or a fragmentation of authority. 
The policy failures up to the mid-1970s had done much to discredit the prevailing paradigm. There 
began a shift in the locus of authority in the UK. The Treasury no longer enjoyed monopoly over 
macroeconomic issues, details of the secret Treasury model were released to the general public, and 
the prime minister overruled the Treasury in favour of the Bank of England on several key issues in 
1977. There was extraordinary intensification in debate about economic issues in the media and 
financial circles.15  
 
2.1.2.5. Stage 5 – Contestation: [Monetarism tied to Conservative Party’s ideology] 
In the fifth stage, as the authority for policy is fragmented and alternative ideas enter the policy 
debate, the paradigms are contested politically and the fate of the alternative paradigm is determined 
by electoral and/or partisan considerations.  
By the time before the election, macroeconomic management had become the subject of intense 
public debate. The Conservative Party adopted monetarist paradigm and proposed it as a new 
approach to the UK’s economic problems, promising both to eliminate inflation and to reduce 
unemployment by adhering to a strict money supply target. “The discourse of monetarism, which 
complemented traditional Conservative antipathy towards unions and interventionism, enabled the 
Conservatives to confront an embattled Labour administration that had no coherent policy paradigm 
                                                          
14
 Hall (1992) p.101 
15
 Hall (1993) p.286 
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upon which to base its pronouncements, state its objectives, or articulate a coherent alternative.”16 
This was a period of contestation in which Conservative politicians showed their strong preference and 
commitment to the new interpretive framework of monetarism. The fate of the monetarist paradigm, 
which had been taken by the Conservatives, then came to depend heavily on the result of the 
elections. 
 
2.1.2.6. Stage 6 – Institutionalization of New Paradigm: [Monetarism] 
In the final stage, if the alternative paradigm receives sufficient political support, it replaces the 
dominant paradigm and begins the process of institutionalization as new actors are brought into 
positions of power and the bureaucracy to implement the ideas of the new paradigm. 
Thatcher’s government marked the stage whereby monetarism began its institutionalization as a new 
paradigm in place of Keynesianism. Margaret Thatcher’s government’s economic management and 
personnel were monetarist. Monetarism became routinized at the Treasury and the Bank of England. 
The dominant paradigm was then monetarism, and the paradigm shift had been completed.17 
Overall, when the UK shifted from the Keynesian economic ideology to monetarist paradigm, the 
policy makers followed different policy prescriptions and changed their fundamental conception of 
how the economy worked.  
 
2.1.3. Paradigm Shift from Central Planning to Market Economy 
More than a decade after the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in the UK, a large scale paradigm 
shift occurred in socialist countries in Eastern Europe, fundamentally changing the principles guiding 
the making of economic policies in these countries. 
In retrospect, the paradigm shift from central planning to market economy in transitional countries 
was immense. This paradigm shift bears similarity to the paradigm shift from Keynesianism to 
monetarism in terms of the economic theories prescribing contrasting sets of economic policies18. In 
                                                          
16
 Blyth, Mark M., (1997), “"Any More Bright Ideas?" The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy”, Comparative 
Politics, Vol.29, p. 229-250. 
17
 It should be noted that today’s macroeconomic policy is a balance between Keynesianism and monetarism. 
18
 Keynesianism: fiscal adjustment is needed for private economy, government spending can reduce unemployment (inflation 
and unemployment can be traded off with each other); monetarism: discretionary policy is an impediment to efficient 
economic performance, unemployment is to be naturally settled by the labour market (inflation and unemployment cannot 
be traded off with each other). 
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economists’ view, the contrast between the two paradigms is substantial, with the former prescribing 
state’s control of the whole economy and the latter explaining the role of the market in economic 
activities. 
 
Table 2: Central Planning vs. Market Mechanism Paradigms 
 
The central planning – market economy paradigm shift also followed the 6 stages as the Keynesianism 
– monetarism paradigm shift in Hall’s model. 
 
Stage 1: In the UK in the 1970s, Keynesianism was the dominant paradigm in macroeconomic policy 
and had been entrenched in the policy system. In Eastern European communist countries in the 1980s, 
central planning was the reigning idea about the way to organize economic activities in these 
countries. This period has policy paradigm stability, as the dominant policy paradigm is 
institutionalized and policy adjustments are made largely by a closed group of experts and officials and 
other members of a closed system (i.e. policy makers use the reigning paradigm in public policy 
making). 
 
Stage 2: In the period of the oil price shock, the UK began to witness the anomaly of stagflation when 
there were both high unemployment and high inflation at the same time and inflation could not be 
traded off for unemployment. While Keynesianism predicts that unemployment can be reduced by 
government through public consumption and investment, the anomaly of stagflation could not be 
Central Planning Market Mechanism 
Enterprises have state ownership  Enterprises are of both state and private 
ownership  
Enterprises as tools to implement central 
plans and have no decision making rights  
Enterprises have own decision making rights 
on what, how and for whom to produce 
Resource allocation is planned by state  Resource allocation is guided by market  
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solved by increased government spending. In socialist countries, though the central planning paradigm 
predicts that the implementation of planned economic activities by state enterprises is the most 
efficient way of organizing the economy, widespread inefficiency could not be solved by the state 
economic sector. This period has accumulation of real-world anomalies, as developments are neither 
anticipated nor fully explicable by the reigning orthodoxy, thereby undermining its effectiveness and 
legitimacy (i.e. there are new/anomalous public policy problems that cannot be explained by the 
reigning paradigm). 
 
Stage 3: Given the persistence of problems, in the UK, ad-hoc measures were taken in response to the 
collapse of the Keynesian paradigm. The new Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan acknowledged 
that a fiscal stimulus could no longer be used to counteract rising levels of unemployment. The 
government paid more attention to monetary targets and embarked on a deep cut in public 
expenditure. In Eastern European countries, governments experimented with the reform of state-
owned-enterprises and recognition of the private sector. These policy experiments were based on 
ideas beyond the dominant paradigms at that time. This period has policy experimentation, as efforts 
are made by subsystem members to stretch the existing regime to account for the anomalies (i.e. 
policy makers try to seek solutions to the problems using the reigning paradigm, both successes and 
failures of such experimentation undermine the dominant paradigm, showing the possibility of 
alternative paradigms). 
 
Stage 4: In the next period in the UK, the policy failures up to the mid-1970s had done much to 
discredit the prevailing Keynesian paradigm. There began a shift in the locus of authority in the UK. The 
Treasury no longer enjoyed monopoly over macroeconomic issues. There was more involvement of 
the Bank of England and intensification in debate about economic issues in the media and financial 
circles. In Eastern European countries, the discrediting of the central planning paradigm was widely 
recognized. There was increasing pressure for change towards higher economic outcomes. This period 
has fragmentation of authority, as experts and officials become discredited and new participants 
challenge the existing subsystem, paradigm and regime (i.e. as solutions based on the reigning 
paradigm do not work, other actors – such as academia, public opinion, media, fractions in the 
government – seek new paradigms to explain the anomaly and propose solutions based on the new 
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paradigms; the new paradigm then attracts political actors in opposition to the incumbent one and is 
adopted by this opponent party). 
 
Stage 5: In the UK case, the next period was a time of contestation in which Conservative politicians 
showed their strong preference and commitment to the new interpretive framework of monetarism. 
The fate of the monetarist paradigm, which had been taken by the Conservatives, then came to 
depend heavily on the result of the elections. In the transitional countries, the decisive shift to the 
market economy paradigm occurred with the political change and thus was backed by strong political 
will to change. This period has contestation, as debate spills into the public arena and involves the 
larger political process, including electoral and partisan considerations (i.e. the battle among the 
paradigms is tied to the political power struggle among the political actors, involving democratic 
debates and elections). 
 
Stage 6: In the last stage, in the UK case, monetarism was institutionalized by Thatcher’s government 
after the victory of the Conservative Party in the election. In the transitional countries, market 
economy paradigm was institutionalized with the political change. This is the stage of 
institutionalization of a new regime in the paradigm shift, in which after a period of time, the 
advocates of a new regime secure positions of authority and alter existing organizational and decision-
making arrangements in order to institutionalize the new subsystem, paradigm and regime (i.e. if the 
party supporting the new paradigm wins in the political process, the new paradigm will gradually be 










Table 3: The 6 Stages of Paradigm Shift in the UK and in Transitional Countries 
Stage UK Transitional Countries 
(1) Paradigm Stability Keynesianism Central planning 
(2) Accumulation of Anomalies Stagflation Economic inefficiency 
(3) Policy Experimentation 
Failed attempts to fix stagflation 
by policies based on 
Keynesianism; Keynesianism 
discredited; success of some 
experiments not following 
Keynesianism but monetarism 
Failed attempts to improve 
economic efficiency by state 
sector; Central planning 
discredited; initial formation of 
private sector through 
privatization 
(4) Fragmentation of Authority 
Widened participation in debate 
on macroeconomic issues; 
monetarism’s rise as alternative 
paradigm 
Acceleration of privatization; 
rise of private sector in bringing 
about economic growth – rise of 
market economy paradigm 
(5) Contestation 
Opposition party’s support of 
monetarism as alternative 
paradigm; competition of 
paradigms tied to political 
contestation 
Market economy paradigm 
associated with political change 
process 
(6) Institutionalization of New 
Paradigm 
Institutionalization of 
monetarism as new policy 
paradigm by Thatcher’s 
government 
Institutionalization of market 
economy as new policy 
paradigm by post-communist 
governments 
 
2.1.4. Paradigm Shift in the Case of Privatization in Hungary 
Hall’s Paradigm Shift model is tested in detail in the case of state enterprise privatization in Hungary, 
one of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe that has successfully transitioned to the market 
economy in the 1990s. In Hungary, privatization was a steady process that started in 1987, slowed 
somewhat before and immediately after the 1994 elections, and picked up again in 1995. By then the 
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government had liquidated more than half of the around 2000 enterprises it owned previously.19 The 
paradigm shift associated with privatization in Hungary can be seen as fitting the Hall’s model of 
paradigm shift in six stages, as follows. 
 
2.1.4.1. Stage 1 – Paradigm Stability: [SOEs to implement central planning] 
After the Second World War, Hungary became a socialist country and had a centrally planned 
economy. Under this economic model, the state played a dominant role in the production and 
distribution of products. In the name of the people, the state owned the majority of enterprises. Under 
the dominant paradigm of central planning, the state-owned firms carried out plans by multilevel 
higher administration. The national plan was elaborated by the Central Planning Board and approved 
by the highest political bodies. The plan indicators at the top were successively disaggregated from 
higher to lower levels. At the bottom, the state-owned firm got hundreds or thousands of mandatory 
plan indicators each year, containing four sets: output targets, input quotas, mandatory financial 
indicators (concerning production costs, profits, credit ceilings), and a list of certain actions to be taken 
by the firm (e.g. introduction of new technologies or products, investment projects, etc.).20 Also, under 
the central planning ideology, which predicted shortcut development with focus on heavy industry, 
Hungary undertook costly projects, such as the Danube hydroelectric power plant and several joint 
projects of Comecon21. As planned, the state sector played the key role in the economy. The state 
sector contributed to 67.4% of national income in 1960, 70.7% in 1970, and 73.3% in 1975.22  
In this stage, the central planning paradigm had been entrenched as a highly coherent system of ideas 
institutionalized into the Hungarian economic system. It corresponds to the first stage in Hall’s model – 
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2.1.4.2. Stage 2 – Accumulation of Anomalies: [Inefficiency] 
Although the SOE sector made up a large part of the economy, the economic results from such a 
system were not up to the prediction of economic development by the central planning paradigm. 
Hungary experienced repeated periods of economic stagnancy, which the government attempted to 
improve by a series of minor reforms within the central planning paradigm. Hungary adopted the New 
Economic Mechanism in 1968, which abolished central plan targets and removed price controls from a 
broad range of goods and services. This was an attempt to boost personal initiative in the economy 
through reforms limiting the state’s involvement in the economy. As the private sector flourished in 
response to economic reforms, authorities gradually attempted to reform the state sector to make it 
as productive as the private sector. However, such SOE reform attempt did not work, leading to a 
“dual economy” consisting of a more highly regulated state sector competing with a less regulated 
private sector.23 This de facto reversal of the New Economic Mechanism, coupled with the adverse 
effects of the energy crisis of the 1970s halted efforts to adjust Hungary’s economy to the world 
market24. There was unwillingness to significantly reduce subsidies to inefficient enterprises and for 
many basic necessities and services, which were kept at an artificially low level. In 1980, in another 
reform attempt, a new pricing system artificially linking domestic and world market prices was 
introduced to force international competition onto firms, but this “competitive pricing system” failed, 
as prices continued to be formed by bargaining between the enterprise and the central body 
responsible for price formation.25 Without much competition, Hungarian industry remained one of the 
most concentrated in the world. Despite heavy investment and preferential treatment, the state 
sector’s contribution to national income gradually decreased from 73.3% in 1975 to 69.8% in 1980, 
65.4% in 1984, and 63.4% in 1986, yet still remained the major component in the economy26. In short, 
until mid-1980s, reforms within the state sector based on central planning paradigm did not 
significantly enhance Hungarian SOEs’ efficiency, and the old paradigm of SOEs as tools to implement 
central planning still prevailed in Hungary despite the inefficiency and poor economic results that the 
country experienced. 
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This stage is also as predicted in Hall’s paradigm shift model – the stability of the dominant paradigm is 
challenged by the accumulation of anomalies which are neither anticipated nor comprehensible in the 
terms of the reigning paradigm. Central planning paradigm’s failure to predict and explain inefficiency 
of an SOE dominant economy is similar to Keynesianism’s failure to predict and explain stagflation in 
the UK. 
It can be noted that Hungary’s New Economic Mechanism had some resemblance with Heath’s 
election platform in the UK – aiming at anti-anomaly targets without a clear paradigm supporting. 
Heath promised reduced public spending without a theoretical framework of how such policy option 
could address the economic problems of inflation and unemployment. Janos Kadar’s New Economic 
Mechanism aimed at reducing inefficiency by stating that profits were enterprises’ main goals and 
enterprises had the rights to make basic decisions without information having to be transmitted 
upward for a more centralized decision. However, without acknowledgement of the roles of supply, 
demand and ownership, the New Economic Mechanism could not address how to let prices be flexible 
without causing inflation and resorted to the central planning approach to deal with this: the 
government introduced “new” practice of price controls by declaring an item’s price as fixed, limited, 
or free.27 This was similar to Heath’s resort to more public spending to deal with stagflation as inflation 
alone in a Keynesian way. 
A minor difference from the UK case is the level of difference between the paradigms. Keynesianism 
and monetarism are two distinctively different paradigms. If viewing the SOE dominance paradigm in 
terms of ownership, the ideas underlying central planning SOEs and market based enterprises are also 
two distinct paradigms. It can be argued that if viewing merely in terms of enterprise managerial 
techniques, the distance between the paradigms involved would seem less pronounced. The New 
Economic Mechanism in this sense was an improvement in the decision making process. However, this 
“decision making improvement” paradigm seems to be a subset in the central planning paradigm, or a 
small one-level-up change within that reigning paradigm. 
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2.1.4.3. Stage 3 – Policy Experimentation: [Privatization to improve business management] 
In the context of overall economic inefficiency, Hungary had some policy experiments to improve 
business performance, including privatization-oriented reorganizations of SOEs.  
In 1984, Hungary passed the Law on Enterprise Self-Governance, which placed two-thirds of Hungarian 
firms under the control of enterprise councils dominated by management.28 This managerial system 
reform was intended to improve the performance of state enterprises.29 In 1986, a bankruptcy law was 
enacted to establish institutions by which an SOE might be liquidated. “Unfortunately, they were 
cumbersome and rarely used”.30 
In 1987, the privatization process began with the largest Hungarian company for the production of 
medical instruments, Medicor. Ten factories of this SOE were reorganized and turned into joint-stock 
companies, the shares of which were sold to Hungarian investors, banks and companies. Medicor 
retained decision-making rights and the handling of shares. In this model of privatization, strategy and 
operative decision-making rights were separated, with the latter placed with the factories operating in 
joint-stock companies.31  
This step was a deviation from the central planning paradigm, though it was carried out in a centrally 
planned manner in the first place, like the previous experiments on price, management, and 
bankruptcy. The operation of the privatized factories was no longer as stipulated in a centralized plan; 
instead, the companies could make their own decisions in production. The seemingly “technical” 
change – separating strategy and operative decision-making rights – was in fact in violation of the 
central planning principle.  
This kind of policy experimentation not in accordance with the prevailing paradigm was similar to the 
case of the UK, where income policies to cope with inflation in 1972-3, 1976-7 led to effective 
economic management without state direct intervention, or when monetary targets adopted 
enhanced leverage of financial markets over government – with the underlying idea stretching 
Keynesianism to the point of breaking. In this privatization experiment, the government merely 
attempt to cope with the inefficiency in the state sector and did not really systematically attempt to 
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adjust the paradigm of state control via enterprises of its own. That was an adjustment in policy 
without challenging the overall terms of the paradigm. Therefore, this stage fits in Hall’s model when 
the dominant paradigm attempts to explain and account for the anomalies through experimental and 
ad hoc policies, which weaken the overall coherence and precision of the paradigm. 
It should be noted that “compared to other transitional economies, Hungarian economy was not as 
desperate at the initial period of transformation”32; and unlike other Eastern European countries, 
Hungary also had a coexisting, growing private sector33, the result of previous reforms. The 1987 
privatization experiment was not driven by an extremely serious economic crisis like in some other 
countries and there was some role of reform-minded actors in search of a new paradigm here. 
 
2.1.4.4. Stage 4 – Fragmentation of Authority: [Privatization driven by various actors] 
SOE privatization in Hungary had an important turning point in the transitional government headed by 
Nemeth (November 1988 – May 1990). Hungary’s 1988 Company Law34 and 1989 Transformation Law 
were adopted, permitting the conversion of state enterprises into joint-stock companies and the 
transfer of up to 20% of the shares of converted enterprises to insiders at discounted prices.35 By 1990, 
about 150 Hungarian companies switched to the form of operation in Medicor’s model, creating a 
wave of “spontaneous privatization”. Though these privatized SOEs made up only about 8% of around 
2000 SOEs in Hungary at that time, they had greater proportion of impact in terms of assets, number 
of employees, and contribution to GDP, as they were among largest SOEs. 36  
The privatization of these SOEs was a policy experimentation that did not follow the prescription of the 
old central planning paradigm. The SOEs adopting privatization initially faced financial difficulties; 
however, “the government did not hurry to save them as it would have done under the former 
system”. In contrast to the old model of centralized decision-making, whereby the enterprises were 
the last chain with sole implementing function, the consideration of companies’ management – “not 
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only managers sitting in the Budapest headquarters but also those in other company units in rural 
areas” – was then taken.37  
The spontaneous privatization experiment was not carried out in consensus. Despite efforts by 
managers of privatized companies to prove the benefits of privatization by showcasing economic 
results, spontaneous privatization was considered “negative politically” and criticized by leaders 
connected to the old party-state system. As a result of heated debate, in March 1990, Hungarian 
parliament set up the State Property Agency to approve transactions (sale, renting, leasing etc.) above 
USD 150,000.38  
It should be noted that the State Property Agency was established after a strong wave of spontaneous 
privatization to reestablish central control on the process, not before it. There had been a shift in the 
locus of authority over the privatization process. The improvement associated with privatization itself 
was an attractive idea encouraging other SOEs to follow suit within the legal framework of the two 
above-mentioned laws. The enterprises’ choice of undergoing privatization had been enabled to be 
automatic with the creation of enterprise councils, consisting of enterprise insiders, which had the 
right to determine the enterprise’s organizational structure, to appoint the chief executive, to decide 
on mergers, to split up into smaller organization and to create joint ventures with foreign firms with 
the state assets under their control. Spontaneous privatization was mainly driven by the enterprises’ 
management as SOEs facing vanishing markets, spiraling debts and cutbacks in state subsidies divided 
themselves into groups of companies, segregating loss-making units, giving the more viable ones the 
opportunity to find new owners, to pursue new markets or to offer debt-equity swaps to banks and 
other creditors39. 
The presence of more actors influencing the privatization process gave rise to debates on different 
approaches to privatization. The State Property Agency had to assume dual obligations to reach 
optimal deals for the state on the one hand, and to privatize speedily, on the other.40 The approach of 
approving transactions led to better privatization asset/revenue management but slower process of 
privatization. Advocates of privatization – not only business management but also researchers – then 
put forward new approaches to speed up privatization pace e.g. sorting SOEs into different categories 
for immediate privatization; restructuring then privatizing; and retained state ownership, etc. That is, 
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the State Property Agency could not impose top-down approaches to privatization on behalf of the 
state without meeting with resistance from other actors.  
Another complication to the privatization process as compared to the previous stage was the 
participation of local governments. In October 1990, the first free elections in more than 40 years were 
held for mayors and members of local representative bodies, bringing into office leaders independent 
of party or of the national government’s opposition. As a part of the national effort to redistribute 
state property, but in a program independent of the State Property Agency and the various sales 
schemes, the Hungarian government embarked on an effort to give property to the local governments. 
Local partial ownership of state firms then added actors to the bargaining table and complicated the 
privatization process.41 Privatization by then was no longer an approach to enhance enterprise 
management. Issues like methods and ownership in the process had come into place as competitive 
justifications for privatization. 
Overall, this stage corresponds to the “Fragmentation of Authority” stage in Hall’s model, when the 
failure of the dominant paradigm to respond to or explain the accumulation of anomalies promotes 
the search for alternative ideas and opens up the policy debate to a wider range of actors. The 
confidence in the principal authorities is undermined and there is a fragmentation of authority over 
privatization. 
 
2.1.4.5. Stage 5 – Contestation: [Privatization tied to ideology of reformers] 
The decisive shift to the market based enterprise paradigm occurred with the political change in 
Hungary in which Nemeth’s government played a transitional facilitating role. Nemeth’s government 
began a systematic dialogue with the opposition in the form of a National Roundtable (March – 
September 1989), wherein the methods of a peaceful transition were discussed by the representatives 
of the government and the major opposition parties. The Parliament then passed a new election law. 
Elections were held in two rounds in March and April 1990. Hungary's first post-socialist government 
(led by the centre-right Hungarian Democratic Forum) came to power in May 1990. The opposition 
was represented by the Alliance of Free Democrats and Hungarian Socialist Party and Fidesz. Because 
these three parties stood for three distinct ideologies, they were unable to create a united front, which 
put them at a considerable disadvantage. By contrast, the coalition of Hungarian Democratic Forum, 






the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats was united under Jozsef Antall, a dominant figure who 
pursued a transition agenda with strong commitment to privatization. 
A certain level of contestation of political actors opting different paradigms can be observed here, 
which suggests that the prediction of such a stage in Hall’s model is validated to some extent. A 
similarity between the Hungarian case and the UK case is that the party/parties (the three opposition 
parties in Hungary and UK Labour Party) who lost the election did not have a clear ideology to back 
their agenda while the political victory of the party advocating the alternative paradigm was somehow 
contingent on the role of certain leaders – UK’s Thatcher and Hungary’s Antall. The role of democracy 
and contingency were present in both the UK case and the Hungarian case.  
In terms of ideational framework, the comprehensiveness of the economic rationale behind 
privatization was lagging behind the political drive for it, similar to the lack of economists’ consensus 
on monetarism as an alternative paradigm in the UK. The “spontaneous privatization” experimentation 
during Nemeth’s government in Hungary bears some degree of resemblance to monetarist policies 
under British Prime Minister James Callaghan’s government. This spontaneous privatization was not 
backed by a distinctive paradigm or a full-fledged socio-economic rationale. Although Nemeth’s 
government was seen as paving the way to pivotal changes in policy making in Hungary, it would be 
superfluous to tie the idea of changing ownership of SOEs via privatization to Nemeth’s government’s 
key ideology. The focus in this period was on changing the management of the enterprises rather than 
promoting private ownership of the enterprises. Privatization had by then moved beyond 
experimentation phase, yet the paradigm behind it had not been developed enough to give a clear 
rationale and direction for approaches to privatization. Privatization as adopted by Antall was not 
significantly different from the process formed under Nemeth’s government or more advanced in 
terms of theory42. In other words, privatization was advocated by its political connotation rather than 
its ideational attraction, which was still not much beyond the experimental phrase. 
 
2.1.4.6. Stage 6 – Institutionalization of New Paradigm:  
[SOEs no longer a dominant force, private enterprises as main force of economy] 
Privatization took deep root with the post-communist governments and within a decade, Hungary’s 
economy was no longer dominated by SOEs. This process was longer than the process of 
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institutionalization of monetarism in the UK – within Thatcher’s term and seemed to be associated 
with the level of democratic grounding and contingent events. 
Antall did not have as a lasting impact on paradigm institutionalization as Thatcher did in the UK simply 
because his commitment to economic transition in general and privatization in particular was 
disrupted by his death on Dec 12, 1993. The elections after that led to alternation of left-centre and 
right-centre governments. However, all governments supported privatization, though the approaches 
to privatization kept changing with each change of authority. 
“In 1990, the new Hungarian political elite was united in the opinion that a wholesale privatization of 
state industries must begin immediately. The overlapping field of their ideologies suggested that 
privatization is a good thing, though the rival political tendencies disagreed on every detail (e.g., what 
needs to be privatized and how, by whom and at what price)”.43 In other words, privatization was then 
not a “rationally guided process”, with no consensus among researchers about theoretical background 
for privatization. In the words of Stiglitz44, “there is a joke about the debate on the speed of 
privatization in Hungary, with those who advocate rapid privatization arguing that privatization must 
be achieved in five years while those who advocate slow privatization urging that matters be taken 
calmly – privatization should take place over five years.” 
Not only in Hungary, but also in other countries undertaking privatization in that period, it was not 
easy to find consensus on the theoretical framework for privatization. On the one hand, the advantage 
of privatization can be seen in the establishment of hard budget constraints and increased 
competition. On the other hand, cost-benefit analysis of the ownership reform process needs to be 
taken, as the assumption of perfect information and zero transaction costs do not hold to justify the 
theory of property rights as the rationale for privatization.45 
“In the mid-1990s, in Hungary, any suggestion that privatization could be delayed because of the 
consideration of costs and other drawbacks was seen as heresy”. 46 The confusion in the academic and 
professional debate greatly assisted the emergence of a situation where special interests, through 
nontransparent lobbying, dominated the directions of actual ownership reform. Lobbies and interest 
groups channeled their endeavors through political parties. This also brought a great deal of ideology 
into the economic policy debate. 
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This stage in Hungarian case of privatization seems to be an escalation of the 5th stage of 
“Contestation” in Hall’s model, in which as the authority for policy is fragmented and alternative ideas 
enter the policy debate, the paradigms are contested politically and the fate of the alternative subsets 
of the paradigm (e.g. methods of privatization) is determined by electoral and/or partisan 
considerations. In this phase, privatization in Hungary was pushed forward by the political process. 
Conflicting priorities and various objectives/concerns (e.g. over what methods of privatization were to 
be used in certain policy periods) were pursued in the ownership reform and were settled through the 
interactions of the constellation of external and internal political factors.47 In other words, the 
theoretical framework justifying privatization emerged through the process of political debates and 
was influenced greatly by partisan consideration. 
In the previous stages, under prime ministers Grosz and Nemeth, spontaneous privatization was 
facilitated towards the government’s goal of recovery from the foreign debt crisis, thus first cases of 
large sales to foreign owners took place. Under Antall and Boross, the focus switched to nationalizing 
privatization, i.e. creating a new Hungarian middle class via the ownership reform while limiting the 
opportunities of foreign owners. The party that advocated restitution became part of the ruling 
coalition, with its policies modified to a politically manageable compensation scheme. Privatization 
was then via compensation vouchers issued in various rounds.  
After the 1994 elections with MSZP’s victory, cash revenue became the main guide for privatization, 
and getting out of the trap of foreign debt once again was used as the framework for privatization. 
When the Fidesz government came into office in 1998, their focus was on recollecting parts of the 
national economy that continued to operate under state control or under the influence of the state. 
“After the apparent end of privatization, the Orban government opened a new round through which 
favored social groups could benefit through easy access to state property still available for 
privatization”. 48  
If solely considering privatization as a policy product, changes in the number of privatized SOEs and 
methods of privatizing can be observed. In the 1995 – 1997 period, sales of large strategic firms were 
accelerated, and from 1997, Hungary switched to capital market methods of privatization (open issues, 
stock exchange sales). However, the process of privatization in this stage showed the contestation of 
alternative paradigms about state vs. private asset ownership and the role of such assets in the 









economy. The change of the role of SOEs in Hungarian economy took place via privatization more 
because of the political process than out of a well-established paradigm of state-market role division 
or property ownership. Yet, the dwindled size and role of SOEs in the politically driven privatization 
finally helped establish a new paradigm in place of the previous paradigm of SOEs as vehicle of central 
planning.  
After nearly a decade of different approaches to privatization, with hardly any particular method of 
privatization enjoying major popular support, the rather quick process of privatization has basically 
changed the paradigm of state’s economic intervention through SOEs in Hungary. Though there had 
not been a unified framework for privatization during the process, privatization finally helped solve the 
anomalies unsettled by the previous paradigm – as observed by Andor (2000), “the system of central 
planning – even its reform versions – were incapable of responding to the world economic crisis by an 
appropriate restructuring of the economy”. 49  
The percentage of firms owned by the state declined considerably between 1992 and 1997, from 
45.9% to 17.3%. Of the 306 firms that the state owned as of 1998, 180 were in the category of long-
term state ownership, and were concentrated in such sectors as agriculture, forestry, and 
transportation.50 
By the beginning of the 21st century, a market economy based on private property has been 
established. The proportion of entrepreneurial assets owned by the state is no longer the majority, but 
similar to corresponding ratios in countries with developed market economies. Hungary joined the 
European Union on 1 May 2004, an event that marked the recognition of its market economy status. 
In short, this stage corresponds to Hall’s model and the impact of contingencies and democratic 
settings is in terms of length of institutionalization time only. The Hungarian case confirms that if the 
alternative paradigm receives sufficient political support, it replaces the dominant paradigm and 
begins the process of institutionalization. The difference is this process did not take place because new 
actors are brought into positions of power and the bureaucracy to implement the ideas of the new 
paradigm (paradigm guided choice of actors by higher level of authority as in the UK case); instead, 
actors themselves came to positions of power (e.g. via elections), chose to stay with the new paradigm 
and adjusted its subsets or adopted different instruments under this paradigm. 
 









2.2. Vietnam's Proactive Paradigm Shift 
2.2.1. Vietnam’s Shortcut in Paradigm Shift in the Case of SOE Privatization 
2.2.1.1. Stage 1 – Paradigm Stability: [SOEs to implement central planning] 
The SOE sector in Vietnam was established mainly after the war against French in 1954 by both 
nationalizing the existing privately owned enterprises and building new SOEs. The Soviet economic 
model was adopted in constructing the SOE sector as Vietnamese leaders then perceived that this 
model offered the quickest way to develop Vietnamese backward agrarian economy. Under this 
paradigm, the most efficient way for economic development was to plan targets for the economy, 
establish enterprises of state ownership, and instruct these SOEs to carry out the centrally planned 
targets.  
By the end of 1960, 100% of industrial establishments, 99.4% of commercial establishments, and 99% 
of transportation facilities which had belonged to foreign and Vietnamese capitalists were nationalized 
and transformed into SOEs. The government spent 61.2% of total budget expenditure for capital 
formation in the SOE sector in the first five-year-plan (1961-65), and 90% for the 1965-68 period.51 In 
their operation, SOEs were under direct control and management of line ministries of the central 
government or different departments of the local government. With no role in deciding what, how, 
and for whom to produce, the SOEs performed the task of production units implementing plans 
formulated by the various ministries and departments above, which specified detailed production and 
other compulsory targets, sources of inputs and output disposal. Operating profits, which were also 
pre-determined in the plan, needed to be transferred to the government budget and losses were 
offset from government budget expenditure.52 
This stage is in line with Hall’s model 1st stage of “Paradigm Stability”: The dominant paradigm of “SOEs 
as the main agent to develop the economy according to plans” defines the scope of the policy 
environment, the questions and problems to be addressed and the instruments in the policy toolbox. 
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2.2.1.2. Stage 2 – Accumulations of Anomalies: [Inefficiency] 
According to the prevailing paradigm of centrally planning, positive economic results were expected, 
and actually Vietnam did undergo a period of good output from SOEs. Yet, inefficiency and 
dependence on foreign aid arose as unexpected anomalies that kept repeating themselves against the 
background of major historical events in the country. However, “centrally planned SOEs as the main 
driving force of the economy” remained the dominant paradigm in this stage. 
The development of the SOE sector brought impressive economic results in the 1960s. In the first five-
year-plan 1960-65, the year-on-year growth rate of gross output value was 13.6% for all industrial 
SOEs, 19.3% for heavy industrial SOEs and 10.4% for light industrial SOEs. However, the operation of 
SOEs did not fit the prescribed central plan, as shown in initial signs of SOEs’ inefficiency. For example, 
SOEs often overused allocated inputs because the assessment criteria were based on the level of 
fulfilling the plan. SOEs also hoarded inputs as the centrally planned mechanism prevented them from 
obtaining materials from non-official sources.53 
The unification of North and South Vietnam in 1975 marked a stage of reconfirmation of the prevailing 
paradigm despite SOEs inefficiency. Vietnam tried to develop the entire economy with the second five-
year-plan, again focusing on developing SOEs. Private and public business establishments of the former 
administration in the South were quickly and forcefully transformed into northern-style SOEs. By early 
1978, 1500 large and small-scale capitalist enterprises, which employed 130,000 workers or 70% of the 
workforce in private capitalist enterprises, were nationalized and converted into 650 SOEs. Significant 
investment was given to industrial SOEs. In 1976, 21.4% of total investment was spent on heavy 
industry and 10.5% on light industry; in 1980, the investments were 29.7% and 11.5% respectively. 54 
The same central planning paradigm applied to the large SOE sector of the unified Vietnam as in the 
previous period in the North. The state assigned to SOEs plans which had been approved by higher 
government levels, which included a system of targets, such as gross output, total value of production, 
main products, total payroll, profits, and transfers to the government budget. The government 
supplied the main materials, provided the markets for the products, and set their selling prices.55  
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However, significant investment in industry and the rapid expansion of the SOE sector did not bring 
about success to the second five-year-plan: The growth rate of national income was 1.7% against the 
target of 13-14% per year. The average annual growth rate of industrial production was 1.5% in 
industrial SOEs compared to 0.6% for the whole economy.56 Inefficiency of the centrally planned SOE 
sector had by then been highly visible, challenging the central planning paradigm, which predicted 
great economic development/lapses, not a stagnant, gloomy economy. 
This stage corresponds well with Hall’s model 2nd stage of “Accumulated Anomalies” whereby 
anomalies that could not be explained by the prevailing paradigm kept manifesting themselves, 
challenging the current paradigm, but the paradigm was still in place and not yet uprooted. The 
difference is that the anomalies in SOE performance did not receive red-flag attention as a prime 
concern because of the contexts of other dramatic issues such as wars, agricultural production, etc. 
 
2.2.1.3. Stage 3 and 4 – Policy Experimentation with Paradigm Shift Goal as Institutionalization 
(Hall’s 6th stage becomes the 4th stage in Vietnam): [Cumulative Change] 
In the context of a possible collapse of the whole economy, Vietnam began a change with a pro-active 
shift in ideological approach – towards “open-door” “new thinking” in economic management. The 
renovation policy in 1986 started a new series of changes in economic management policy. The SOE 
sector underwent many reforms and the privatization process began in 1992. 
By the mid-1980s, Vietnam’s economy was faced with serious difficulties. The economy grew by 
merely 3% in 1986, while annual inflation surged to triple-digit figures. The main causal factors were 
low level of production, particularly in agriculture, and large losses and inefficiency in overstaffed 
SOEs. In the context of the severe economic crisis, the government realized that the planning model 
based on state ownership was no longer economically and politically sustainable. At its 6th National 
Congress in December 1986, Vietnam's Communist Party decided to switch from the central planning 
model of socialism to a "market-oriented socialist economy under state guidance"57, an overall new 
direction in policy often referred to as “Doi moi” (i.e. renovation).  
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Concurrent with liberalization of the economy, in 1989, the Government relaxed restrictions on the 
establishment of new SOEs and granted full autonomy to all SOEs. This was done without specifying 
SOEs responsibilities or setting up financial control systems to monitor their activities. The result was a 
surge in the number of SOEs (as of 1 January 1990, Vietnam had 12,297 SOEs in operation) and 
irresponsible behavior by a significant segment of the State enterprise sector.58 By then, it had been 
widely acknowledged by the academia as well as Vietnamese policy makers that due to many factors, 
such as “unclear objectives, poor management, and soft budget constraint”59, the economic 
performance of SOEs was not satisfactory, causing budget deficits to the government60. This situation 
necessitated a comprehensive SOE reform, especially in the context of the growing domestic private 
sector and foreign competition induced by Vietnam’s enhanced international economic integration. 
The government then launched a reform program including restructuring of SOEs, and the number of 
SOEs was reduced to 6,264 by April 1994.61 
With the dual goals of meeting the renovation policy and tackling the shortcomings of the state sector, 
the government embarked on its policy experimentation in privatization as part of the SOE reform 
endeavors. Decision No.143/HDBT of the Council of Ministers dated 10 May 1990 on pilot 
“equitization” (“co phan hoa”, a Vietnamese term meaning “turning into equities”62). The 1992 SOE 
equitization pilot program called for transformation of a limited number of viable or potentially viable 
small-scale, nonstrategic SOEs into joint-stock companies subject to the Law on Companies. This was 
to be accomplished through sales of enterprise shares to employees on preferential terms, to 
domestic private and public investors, and to foreign investors on a limited basis.  
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This equitization experiment was a slow process. Between 1992 and 1995, only five SOEs were 
transformed through equitization.63 The streamlining of SOEs in this period was mainly due to other 
measures of SOE reform and not via privatization. The Law on State Enterprises, enacted in April 1995, 
granted full autonomy to SOEs, held them responsible for their actions, and required approval of their 
financial statements by a competent State agency. It classified SOEs into two categories: (i) State 
Business Enterprises which operate on a profit basis and without subsidies; and (ii) State Public Service 
Enterprises which operate in accordance with State social and defense/security policies and are 
eligible for subsidies. The Law also called for the formation of State corporations64. By the end of 1996, 
Vietnam had 6,020 SOEs employing around two million people. These comprised about 1,140 
enterprises belonging to State corporations, 500 centrally-controlled State enterprises, and 4,380 
locally-controlled State enterprises. The State corporations and their enterprises accounted for 42% of 
total SOE output, 47% of its employment, and 74% of its profits. Within the corporations, 154 SOEs 
(corresponding to 13.5% of its members) were loss-makers, while 62 (12.4%) of the 500 independent 
centrally-controlled SOEs incurred losses in 1996.  
The Government committed itself more firmly to privatization with the introduction of Decree 28-CP in 
1996 and its amendments in 1997, establishing the legal framework for privatization in Vietnam. This 
decree extended the scope of privatization to all non-strategic small and medium sized SOEs and 
required SOE controlling agencies (ministries, minister-level institutions, People's Committees, and 
State corporations) to select enterprises for privatization. 
Decree 44/1998/ND-CP on transforming SOEs into joint-stock companies was issued, imposing share 
buying limits ranging from 5% to 20% depending on the types of buyers and enterprises on the 
criterion of their strategic position in the state sector; shares of non-strategic SOEs could be bought 
without any limit. This accelerated the pace of privatization, and by 31 December 2001, 548 SOEs had 
been privatized. 
Privatization was further sped up after Decree 187/2004/ND-CP, which extended the scope of SOEs to 
be privatized and required public auctioning at stock exchanges. Privatization became an important 
impetus for the development of the stock market in Vietnam. A link was built between the SOE 
privatization process and the listing of the privatized enterprises in the Stock market once the 
enterprise fulfills listing requirements. A plan on developing Vietnam’s securities market for the 2006-
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2010 period was issued together with Decision No.898/QD-BTC by Ministry of Finance dated February 
20, 2006 – “On the Promulgation of 2006-2010 Vietnam Securities Market Development Plan” with the 
goal of helping to link privatization with the enterprises’ market listings, and facilitating the listing and 
offering of state equities in many enterprises where the State need not hold controlling shares. For the 
state’s share of ownership in enterprises, Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation65 was 
established by Decision No.151/2005/QD-TTg dated May 26, 2005 to represent state capital ownership 
in privatized enterprises. 
In response to concerns of non-transparent transfers in privatization as a disguised form of corruption, 
Decree 109/2007/NĐ-CP on Transforming Enterprises with 100% State-owned-capital into Joint-stock 
Companies dated 26 June 2007 was promulgated, stating that one of the targets of SOE equitization is 
“open and transparent implementation according to market principles; reducing the prevalence of 
internal equitization within the enterprises”. Also, Decree 87/2007/NĐ-CP on issuing Regulation on 
Ensuring Democracy in Joint-stock and Limited Companies was promulgated on 28 May 2007, laying 
the foundation for transparent operation of enterprises after privatization. 
After various experiments, there had been ample legal framework for privatization to take place with 
one of the following four forms: (1) keeping state shares intact and issuing new shares; (2) selling part 
of the existing state shares; (3) detaching and then selling parts of an SOE (a method mostly applied to 
State general corporations); and (4) selling off all state shares to workers and private shareholders (a 
method mostly applied to loss-making SOEs). With some level of speeding up in pace66, privatization in 
Vietnam is slowly maturing. Privatized firms are doing better and better, and state revenues have 
increased in comparison with the pre-equitization period. There have been no significant labor lay-offs, 
bringing comfort to those who fear large-scale unemployment in privatized firms. By the end of 2011, 
about 4000 SOEs had been privatized and the remaining 1300 were planned to complete privatization 
by the end of 2015.67  
There has been a paradigm shift in the management and ownership of enterprises in the economy. At 
the beginning, changing ownership was not the government’s motivation in pursuing privatization. 
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Fiscally driven privatization68 satisfied the government’s need to get rid of poorly-performing SOEs in 
order to relieve financial pressure and to maintain a positive image of the “trimmed”, yet still large, 
public sector. The equitization target had been designed such that even if it had been reached in 2008 
as planned, the ownership of the economy would not change significantly.69 However, the privatization 
has made significant changes to the ownership structure in the economy. The SOEs now occupy a 
decreasing proportion in the economy – 38.4% in 2005, 35.9% in 2007 and 34.4% in 2008, (which is 
lower than the plan of 36% by 201070). In the 2006-2010 period, the SOEs took up 45% of total 
investment but created only 28% of GDP, while the non-SOEs occupied only 28% of investment but 
created 46% of GDP71. 
 
2.2.2. Vietnam's "Prolonged Shortcut" in SOE Privatization: A low level of institutionalization of the 
new paradigm as a result 
In the 3rd stage of Experimentation, elevated towards Paradigm Institutionalization (the 6th stage in 
Hall's model), Vietnam’s SOE reform in general and privatization in particular was not in accordance 
with the prediction by Hall’s model. Unlike the Hungarian case, Vietnam did not go through the stages 
of “Fragmentation of Authority” and “Contestation” to institutionalize the paradigm of market-based 
enterprises. Incremental policy experimentation seemed to have accumulated to a paradigm shift that 
had been proclaimed by the government more than two decades ago when they proactively began the 
renovation policy and before the actual privatization process, not after the completion of the 
privatization process like in the Hungary case. 
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It should be noted that in Hall’s Paradigm Shift model, the move from the 3rd to the 4th stage and the 
contestation in the 5th stage seem to be based on the assumption that the policy issue is in the context 
of a democratic system whereby the different actors have more or less equal footing in advocating 
their viewpoints, and the institution in authority does not have the power to change the rule of the 
game to preserve its authority. This assumption holds in the case of the UK’s shift from Keynesianism 
to monetarism and still holds, though not as strictly, in the case of Hungary’s shift from the “SOEs as 
the driving force” paradigm to the “market economy” paradigm via privatization. In Hungary, the 
election victory went to Antall’s coalition (which supported privatization with a clear pro-market 
economy ideology) against Nemeth’s coalition (although Nemeth was the initiator of privatization 
policy experiments, his coalition did not have a well-defined paradigm related to ideological change via 
privatization as the opposition). This was similar to the victory of Thatcher’s Conservative Party over 
the Labour Party, although the latter’s Callaghan was the one who began the policy experiments that 
undermined Keynesianism and confirmed monetarism72. 
In Vietnam, the paradigm shift, beginning with government’s proactive renovation policy, was not 
solely driven by the government. Many other actors joined the policy arena. However, their 
participation in the policy process did not come as an opposing force threatening the existence of the 
government, and their policy advice inputs have been incorporated in incremental changes via 
experiments. 
In the “renovation policy” period, besides measures to mobilize domestic resources, the government 
also sought loans from donors, and SOE reform, including privatization, had become a condition from 
the WB, IMF, ADB etc. The government could no longer make policies out of a political will vacuum, 
but began to realize the need to consider new demands arising from the country’s own population and 
possible influence of aid donors and foreign investors on economic policy. However, the level of 
impact from diverse actors had not yet been equivalent to a fragmentation in authorities over SOE 
reform policy in general and SOE privatization in particular. The central government remained the 
main source of gradual change through its pilot/experimental policies on equitization. 
Without an alternative political party, the prediction in Hall’s model that the fate of the paradigm is 
decided by its political association falls flat. In the case of Vietnam the entry for the alternative 
paradigm is not via the entry of new actors from outside the current regime, replacing the latter. The 
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crisis associated with anomalies did play some role in the paradigm shift, yet still left enough time for a 
process other than instant change in policy instruments and immediate acknowledgement of a 
distinctively new, yet not well-defined paradigm. It seems that the indirect impact (and not direct 
involvement) of outside actors (donors, academia, etc.) on reform-minded insiders, has led to the 
latter mediating institutional and ideational tensions to drive a cumulative paradigm shift from within 
the current regime in authority. The sequencing and results of the privatization process in Vietnam 
seem to point out an “anomaly” to Hall’s Paradigm Shift model that there might be a “short-cut” in 
the stages of a paradigm shift. A kind of “proactive paradigm shift” might materialize via the 
cumulative succession of small incremental measures, perhaps as an acceleration of previous ad hoc 
policy experiments. 
What is more, the high level of institutional stability allows the regime to absorb external shocks and 
change its ideational framework step by step to preserve its legitimacy in each policy choice. The 
prolonged process in turn allows the policy regime to benefit from international policy learning. That 
is, as followers, Vietnam could benefit from international experience in designing privatization policies 
to minimize the risk of failure in its trial-and-error experiments in privatization. By the late 1990s, the 
“market economy” paradigm justifying the rationale and benefits of privatization had been well-
developed. The new paradigm is now gradually internalized as a growing number of domestic scholars 
have absorbed the theoretical framework of the market economy and foreign donors’ advice is no 
longer considered an opponent voice driving a hostile agenda. Based on a common theoretical ground, 
the perspectives of different actors tend to converge around justifying the full-fledged paradigm; no 
group really played the role of the pioneer, the challenger, or the dramatic change maker. Once reform 
has been acknowledged as a goal to be reached, change is no longer expected as the trophy of the 
victorious party in the contestation. In other words, path dependence can account for the obstinacy of 
the old paradigm in the sense that the actors in authority can change the “rule of the game” to 
preserve the current institutional setting in the name of the old paradigm (e.g. proactive “renovation 
policy”) so that the ideational tension is reduced, thus enabling a paradigm shift via cumulative 
succession of small incremental measures. 
In short, while the paradigm shift in Hungary in particular and in Eastern Europe in general follows the 
6-stage paradigm shift as in Hall's model, the paradigm shift in Vietnam follows a 4-stage shortcut 
























of New Paradigm 
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Table 4: Paradigm Shift from Central Planning to Market Economy 
Stages Transitional Countries Vietnam 
(1) 
Paradigm Stability 








Failed attempts to improve economic 
efficiency by state sector; Central 
planning discredited; initial formation of 
private sector through privatization 
A series of policy experiments based 
on the country’s own experience and 





Acceleration of privatization; rise of 
private sector in bringing about 





Market economy paradigm associated 




of New Paradigm 
Institutionalization of market economy 
as new policy paradigm by post-
communist governments 
Gradual change towards the market 
economy 
 
3. Analysis of Vietnam's "Proactive Paradigm Shift" by Application of Game Theory 
This part explains the divergence in Hall's paradigm shift model and Vietnam's proactive paradigm shift 
approach by applying game theory analysis. The model of 4 stages of "Proactive Paradigm Shift" – 
Vietnam's shortcut as compared to the 6-stage Paradigm Shift model by Peter Hall will be analyzed as 
two games: The first is a "Paradigm Choice" game that is played once, followed by the second series of 
games – a repeated "Formulator - Implementer Interaction" game. 
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3.1. The "Paradigm Choice" Game 
It should be noted that in Hall’s Paradigm Shift model, the new paradigm itself is not the only factor 
that leads to its victory over the old one. It is the political support of the new idea and the 
mechanism that encourages ideational debate and political contestation (enabling the 4th and 5th 
stages) that brings about the opportunity of the new paradigm getting the official recognition in the 6th 
stage. The institutionalization of the new paradigm happens after the stages of authority 
fragmentation and contestation. That is, the new paradigm is not fully developed in these 4th and 5th 
stage, and is fully established only in the 6th stage.  
In the Hungary case, the privatization process in 4th and 5th stages, before Antall’s coalition’s victory 
over Nemeth’s, had moved beyond experimentation phase and the privatization approach was no 
longer mere reactions to earlier practices, yet the paradigm behind it had not been developed enough 
to give a clear rationale and direction for approaches to privatization. Privatization as adopted by 
Antall was not significantly different from the process formed under Nemeth’s government or more 
advanced in terms of theory. Privatization was advocated by its political connotation rather than its 
ideational attraction, which was still not much beyond the experimental phrase. 
Vietnam’s economy was agricultural, thus enterprise reform did not promise the same level of political 
force in bringing about the regime change as in Eastern European countries, like the case of Hungary. 
What is more, when Vietnam embarked on privatization in the early 1990s, at least 5 years after 
Eastern European countries, the “market economy” paradigm in the operation of enterprises and 
other economic activities had been the winning paradigm and that paradigm was also compatible 
with Vietnam’s official proclamation of an “open-door” policy. Thus, Vietnam’s “short-cut” to avoid 
the 4th and 5th stages of authority fragmentation and contestation was both reasonable and 
possible, and not an “anomaly” to Hall’s Paradigm Shift model. Vietnam’s “proactive paradigm shift” 
to move from the 3rd stage of Policy Experimentation to the last stage of Paradigm Institutionalization 
can be explained by the application of game theory in this section. 
Game theory provides researchers with a systematic way to study strategic situations in many fields, 
such as economics, politics, law, business, and policy science. In the explanation of the policy process 
in Vietnam, the language of strategic form representation of a game can be used in modeling the 
paradigm shift routes. The strategic form of a game is specified by three objects: (1) The list of players 
in the game; (2) The set of strategies available to each player, and (3) The payoffs associated with any 
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strategy combination.73 Vietnam’s short-cut 4 stage route can be seen as a “Paradigm Choice” game 
with the players, strategies and payoffs. 
In Hall's Paradigm Shift model, there are two players in the game: the government (Player A) who is 
still struggling with the old paradigm that cannot guide policies to deal with the arising problems and 
the potential government-challenger/opposition group (Player B) supporting the new paradigm. The 
contestation between the old and new paradigms – the 5th stage – is made possible because of the 
fragmentation of authority – the 4th stage – when the ideas are openly discussed and debated among 
different groups in the whole society. The move from the 3rd stage of Player A's policy experimentation 
(that leads to the emergence of the new paradigm) to the 4th and 5th stage is based on the assumption 
that Player A does not foresee the importance of the new paradigm and the payoff that Player B can 
gain when showing support for the new paradigm. It is also assumed that the participation of Player B 
is inevitable and Player A cannot invalidate Player B by taking advantage of its first-mover advantage 
or to change the rule of the game. 
The pro-active paradigm shift in the case of Vietnam shows that there is a possibility of Player A to 
change his strategy to get the payoff associated with the claim of ownership for the new paradigm. If 
Player A observes that the new paradigm is likely to win political support, then Player A can claim that 
he owns the new paradigm or the new paradigm is based on the old paradigm that he has been using. 
This strategy reduces the strength of Player B who also supports the new paradigm and makes it less 
likely for Player B to become the winner who pushes for the new paradigm to deal with the problems 
unsolved under the old paradigm. 
In short, in game theory language, there are two players in the game of paradigm shift, the 
government (Player A) and its potential challenger – the emerging opposition (Player B), and there are 
two strategies: adopt the old paradigm and adopt the new paradigm. The payoffs are expressed as the 
victory of the players (if Player A wins, then Player B loses and vice versa).  
Table 5: Three Objects of the “Paradigm Choice” Game 
Player Player A: Government and Player B: Opposition 
Strategy Adopt old paradigm or Adopt new paradigm 
Payoff Win or Lose 
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The interactions can be expressed in extensive form representation74, which is a pictoral 
representation of the rules with the “game tree” as its main pictoral form. A game tree starts from a 
root. At this starting point, one of the players has to make a choice. Branches from the root represent 
the choices available to this player. At the end of each branch, either of two things can happen. The 
tree might itself end with that branch, which signifies an end to the game. Alternatively, it might split 
into further branches. 
The interactions between Player A and Player B, their strategies as available choices to them and the 
final payoffs can be represented in the following “game tree”. The labels on the branches show the 
choice of strategy that leads the player there. The node at the end of each branch shows the player 
that can make the choice at that moment. As the government is incumbent, it has the first-mover 
advantage, thus Player A is shown at the root of the game tree. 
 












In the table form, the game can be expressed as follows 
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Player A wins 
Player A wins 
Player B wins 









Table 6: Strategies and Payoffs in the “Paradigm Choice” Game 
                                     Player B 
Player A 
Old paradigm New paradigm 
Old paradigm Both players lose (because the 
problems are not solved under 
the old paradigm) 
Player A loses, Player B wins 
New paradigm Player A wins, Player B loses Player A wins, Player B loses 
(Player A's first-mover 
advantage gives him added 
value to final payoff) 
 
Applying Von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function75, numbers can be put in the table to represent 
payoffs. Numbers can be attached to correspond to the ranks (e.g. 0, 1, 2, 3…); a higher payoff would 
signify a preferred alternative (i.e. 2>1>0). The various outcomes in a game can be seen as different 
options for each player to choose; and the player can systematically rank the various outcomes. Any 
numbering that corresponds to the ranking – a higher number for the higher rank – can then be 
viewed as a payoff or utility function. 
Thus, apart from the extensive form, this “Paradigm Choice” game can also be represented in the 
strategic form, in which the payoff numbers would get written in the cells of the strategic matrix, as in 
the following table. 
Table 7: Matrix of Payoffs in the “Paradigm Choice” Game 
Player A                            Player B Old paradigm (strategy b1) New paradigm (strategy b2) 
Old paradigm (strategy a1) 0,0 0,1 
New paradigm (strategy a2) 1,0 2,1 
 
This is a game with dominant strategies for the players and the solution is a pure strategy. For both 
Player A and Player B, choosing "new paradigm" is the dominant strategy. 
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As defined in Dutta (1999)76, a strategy   
  is dominated by another strategy   
 , if the latter does at 
least as well as    
  against every strategy of the other players, and against some it does strictly better, 
such that 
   (  
 ,    ) ≥    (  
 ,    ), for all     
If a strategy is not dominated by any other, it is called an undominated strategy. A dominant strategy is 
a special kind of undominated strategy. A dominant strategy is a strategy that dominates every other 
strategy. 
No rational player will play a dominated strategy but would rather play one of his undominated 
strategies. A rational player would not expect his opponent to play a dominated strategy either. 
Elimination of dominated strategies can lead to a chain reaction that successively narrows down how a 
group of rational players will act. If there is eventually a unique prediction, it is called the IEDS (iterated 
elimination of dominated strategies) solution. 
Table 8: Solving for the Equilibrium in the “Paradigm Choice” Game 
Player A                            Player B b1 b2 
a1 0,0 0,1 
a2 1,0 2,1 
 
Looking at the payoffs, the dominant strategy for both players will be to choose "new paradigm", 
because this strategy ensures that    (  
 ,    ) ≥    (  
 ,    ), for all      
Player A will ensure higher payoffs (1 or 2 vs 0) if he chooses "new paradigm" strategy. 
PayoffPlayer A  ("new paradigm" strategy, [given] any strategy by Player B) > PayoffPlayer A  ("old paradigm" 
strategy, [given] any strategy by Player B) (1>0 and 2>0) 
Player B will ensure higher payoffs (1 vs 0) if he chooses "new paradigm" strategy. 
PayoffPlayer B  ("new paradigm" strategy, [given] any strategy by Player A) > PayoffPlayer B  ("old paradigm" 
strategy, [given] any strategy by Player A) (1>0 and 1>0) 
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This is the case of the game with a dominant strategy. By definition, a dominant strategy solution to a 
game exists when every player has a dominant strategy. A dominant strategy gives higher payoffs than 
every other strategy regardless of what other players do.77 
Player A will always choose strategy a2 to ensure that whatever Player B’s strategy is, Player A still has 
the highest payoff possible78. In the same logics, Player B will choose strategy b2. Thus, the solution of 
the game is: Player A chooses "new paradigm" strategy and wins over Player B; the combination of 
strategies (a2, b2) and the payoff (2,1) with higher payoff for Player A is the Nash equilibrium of the 
game. By definition79, the strategy vector s* =   
 ,   
 , …,   
  is a Nash equilibrium if    (  
 ,    
 ) ≥    (   
,   
 ,), for all    and all i. (2,1) gives the best payoffs for both players in their combination of strategies. 
This is a one-off game with one and only one Nash equilibrium. Player A’s first move and its strict 
adherence to strategy a2 is rational as it ensures the best outcome possible for Player A. In other 
words, the Nash equilibrium of the “Paradigm Choice” game explains why the government chooses to 
proactively claim that it has adopted the new paradigm. It is the rational choice given the rules of the 
game. 
In short, with the application of game theory in explaining the 4-stage shortcut as a paradigm choice, 
Vietnam's government's "proactive paradigm shift" is the strategy to obtain Nash equilibrium. This is a 
rational strategy to ensure the government’s winning in the game to retain its power and avoid the 
fate of being defeated by the opposition adopting the “new paradigm” as its policy direction – as has 
been predicted by Hall's model. It is not an "anomaly" that deviates from Hall's model, but is a stable 
pure strategy solution in this "Paradigm Choice" game with the choice of strategies and order of 
playing based on the pattern captured by Hall’s model. 
 
3.2. The "Formulator - Implementer Interactions" Game 
The “Paradigm Choice” game explored in the previous section is a one-off game and its Nash 
equilibrium is reached when Player A chooses strategy “new paradigm” first in order to win over Player 
B, thanks to Player A’s first-mover advantage, although Player B’s best strategy choice is also “new 
paradigm”. However, this game only explains why Vietnam’s paradigm shift via privatization had the 4-
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stage short-cut omitting the 4th and 5th stages as compared to Hall’s model but does not explain the 
whole long process of the overall “Proactive Paradigm Shift” game in Vietnam. The prolonged process 
of privatization and its problems can be captured in a series of games – repeated games that adhere to 
the same set of rules – in the implementation process of the privatization policy, the “Formulator - 
Implementer Interactions” game. 
It should be noted that the new paradigm of monetarism in the UK case and the market economy 
paradigm in the Hungary case were not well established during the 3rd, 4th and 5th stages. It only 
became clearly defined in the 6th stage of paradigm institutionalization when new actors are brought 
into the policy making process after the political victory of the party adopting the new paradigm as its 
policy direction. 
In the UK case, monetarism became institutionalized during Thatcher’s government after the victory of 
the Conservative Party. In the Hungary case, although the victory of Antall’s coalition was similar to 
that of Thatcher’s Party, Antall did not have as the same impact on paradigm institutionalization as 
Thatcher did in the UK within his Prime Minister term, which he could not finish before his death in 
1993. However, the market economy paradigm in privatization continued to be developed by both 
left-centre and right-centre governments that came in the subsequent elections. All post-Antall 
governments supported privatization, though the approaches to privatization kept changing with each 
change of authority. Privatization was seen as the march towards the market economy, a direction 
that governments of all different political parties in Hungary wanted to keep. The paradigm shift 
during privatization in Hungary followed Hall’s 6-stage model with Antall’s government as the starting 
point of the 6th stage of paradigm institutionalization. Governments after Antall’s did not have the 
paradigm first-adopter advantage that Thatcher’s party and Antall’s coalition had in their political 
contestation with Labour Party and Nemeth’s coalition. The “paradigm choice” of post-Antall 
governments was different from Vietnam’s government’s proactive paradigm shift because by then 
the paradigm choice did not give them a winning edge over their opposition. However, each and 
every government after Antall was committed to the privatization policy to institutionalize the market 
economy paradigm, although the specific approaches to privatization differed and might be influenced 
by nontransparent lobbying of special interest groups. Therefore, Hungary’s paradigm shift was similar 
to UK’s paradigm shift in the 6-stage model up until the election between Nemeth’s coalition and 
Antall’s coalition; but the paradigm choice by post-Antall governments was similar to Vietnam’s 
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government’s choice when moving from the 3rd stage of policy experimentation to the last stage of 
paradigm institutionalization.  
In the Vietnam case, even when Player B (the opposition) can be excluded in the "Paradigm Choice" 
game80, the next rounds of "games" still have some authority fragmentation and contestation and 
involve a number of players. Two groups of players in the next games are policy formulators and policy 
implementers. The existence of the two players (Player C – Formulator and Player D – Implementer) 
shows fragmentation in authority at a micro level (as compared to the macro paradigm level) and the 
interactions between these players might involve some contestation. 
If the policy by Player C reflects the new paradigm (i.e. the paradigm is institutionalized/mainstreamed 
into the policy), then Player D can either choose to implement it as it is (if he finds it in his interest to 
adopt the new paradigm) or not to implement it until he has no other option (if he finds it not in his 
interest to adopt the new paradigm), in which case slow and/or shallow change might be expected due 
to possible resistance from Player D. The slow change is what has been observed in the pace of SOE 
privatization in Vietnam as compared to the faster pace of privatization in Hungary, which follows the 
6 stages in Hall's model. This can be seen as an exchange between political stability and the level of 
institutionalization of the new paradigm: the higher the level of political stability, the slower the pace 
at which the new paradigm is institutionalized. The assumption is that: Player A's "proactively shifted" 
paradigm (the new paradigm that Player A claims to have adopted and used in his policies to deal with 
the problems which could not be solved under the old paradigm) is the same as a new paradigm that 
could have been shaped through the process of authority fragmentation and contestation under Hall's 
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Table 9: Differences between Hall’s Paradigm Shift Model and Vietnam’s Proactive Paradigm Shift 
                                  Content 
Change manner   
Paradigm Establishment Paradigm Institutionalization 
With Player B (Hall's model) Experimentation + authority 
fragmentation + contestation 
Institutionalization (political 
change + quick policy change) 
Without/with minor role for 
Player B (Vietnam's proactive 
paradigm shift) 
Experimentation in improved 
policy formulation 
Implementation  (political 
stability + slow policy change) 
 
However, the assumption that the proactively shifted paradigm is the same as a new paradigm (the 
new paradigm that could have been shaped through the process of authority fragmentation and 
contestation) is not likely to hold in all cases of policy formulation. The so-called "new paradigm" has 
been reached through a short-cut as the government claims that it has adopted a new paradigm and 
will use the paradigm in guiding policy to deal with the problems. The government combines the 
political support for the old paradigm and new paradigm by labeling the new paradigm outside the 
old paradigm (as reflected in the unique phrase “socialist-oriented market economy” – which, in the 
language of the concepts explored in this thesis, means “new paradigm oriented by old paradigm”). 
This might lead to a low level of mainstreaming of the paradigm into the policy in cases where a 
certain percentage of policy formulators are not aware of the new paradigm or do not have incentives 
to incorporate the new paradigm into the policy. That is, unlike the "Paradigm Choice" game, there is 
no pure dominant strategy for the first-mover player, but instead Player C has a certain percentage of 
likelihood to adopt Strategy 1 and the rest of likelihood to adopt Strategy 2. 
In the case of SOE privatization, the privatization process was started with the dual goal of serving as a 
renovation policy in the general open-door policy and tackling the shortcomings of the state sector. 
The market economy direction has been acknowledged as a goal and the privatization policy is a 
means to carry out that goal (proactively shifted paradigm of “socialist-oriented market economy”), 
instead of being a process that would lead to a new paradigm of the market economy that was 
previously not officially acknowledged by the government. Therefore, the pro-market paradigm might 
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not be the main consideration in the formulation of privatization policy, or the new paradigm might 
not be mainstreamed into the privatization policy in some aspects or in certain cases. 
Thus, in the "policy game", Player C has two strategies to adopt: (1) to mainstream the new paradigm 
(that has been proactively claimed to be shifted to by the government even before the policy is to be 
formulated and implemented) into the formulated policy; and (2) not to mainstream the new 
paradigm into the formulated policy. Player D also has to strategies to adopt: (1) to implement the 
formulated policy; and (2) not to implement the formulated policy. 
As the policy making process involves the repetition of trial-error-revision steps, this game is a 
repeated game with many rounds of interactions between Player C – policy formulator – and Player D 
– policy implementer. 
The solution for this game is not a pure strategy but instead a mixed strategy. 
By definition, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over a player's pure strategies. The payoff to 
a mixed strategy is computed as the expected payoff to its component pure strategies. There is a 
mixed strategy that dominates a pure strategy    even though no other pure strategy is able to 
dominate    By definition, there will always be a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, although there 
are games with no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.81 
Each round of the game might have a different outcome, depending on the choice of strategies by the 
players in each situation. The overall outcome is the accumulation/sum of all the possible outcomes. In 
cases where the formulator Player C mainstreams the paradigm into the policy and the implementer 
Player D implements the formulated policy, effective policy towards the new paradigm direction is 
yielded (Quarter 1). In cases where Player C mainstreams the paradigm into the policy but Player D 
does not implement the formulated policy immediately (until he is pressured to do so, possibly with 
extra interventions from other factors/players), slow, incremental change towards the new paradigm 
direction might be expected (Quarter 2). In cases where Player C does not mainstream the new 
paradigm into the policy and Player D finds it in his interest to implement the formulated policy, the 
outcome would be driven by Player D's agenda and might not go towards the new paradigm (Quarter 
4). The cases where Player C does not mainstream the new paradigm into the policy and Player D does 
not implement the formulated policy are the status quo situations of accumulated 
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anomalies/problems that have yet to be solved (stage 2 in both Hall's model and Proactive Paradigm 
Shift model) (Quarter 3). 
 
Table 10: Strategies and Payoffs Involving Formulators and Implementers 
                                 Implementer 
Formulator  
implement formulated policy not implement formulated 
policy 
mainstream new paradigm into 
formulated policy 
effective policy towards new 
paradigm direction  
incremental change towards 
new paradigm direction  
not mainstream new paradigm 
into formulated policy 
outcome driven by 
implementer's agenda, not 
towards new paradigm 
status quo of unsolved problems 
 
With the application of the Von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function82, numbers can be put in the 
table to represent payoffs and the game representing the interactions between the policy formulator 
and the implementer can be simplified as follows. 
 
Table 11: Matrix of the “Formulator - Implementer Interactions” Game 
Player C                            Player D strategy d1 [probability q] strategy d2 [probability (1-q)] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,1 (1,0) 
strategy c2 [probability (1-p) 1,1 (0,0) 0,0 
 
The payoffs in brackets are the benefits for the players in terms of the new paradigm only. However, 
this “Formulator - Implementer Interactions” game is different from the “Paradigm Choice” game in 
that the payoffs to the players do not come solely from the new paradigm: Once the paradigm has 
been claimed to be adopted, it is no longer the vital force that determines what player stays like in the 
case of the one-off “Paradigm Choice” game. The factors unrelated to the new paradigm (e.g. benefits 
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for the implementers, level of awareness, sense of idea ownership and responsibility of the 
formulators, etc.) decide the players' probability of adopting the strategies and also the payoffs to the 
players. Therefore, the solution to this game is not the pure strategy combination (c1, d1) that would 
lead to the best outcome for the paradigm of (1,1) if only the benefits in terms of the new paradigm is 
considered. 
Table 12: 2nd Game Payoffs in Terms of the New Paradigm 
                                    Player D 
Player C 
strategy d1 [probability q] strategy d2 [probability (1-q)] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,0 
strategy c2 [probability (1-p) 0,0 0,0 
 
The solution is a mixed strategy depending on the probability that each player chooses a certain 
strategy. 
 
Table 13: 2nd Game Overall Payoffs for Player C and D 
                                          Player D 
Player C 
strategy d1 [probability q] strategy d2 [probability (1-q)] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,1 
strategy c2 [probability (1-p) 1,1  0,0 
 
The result of this mixed strategy is the existence of cases of privatization driven by the implementer's 
motivation when the formulator does not mainstream the paradigm into the policy [at the 
probability of (1-p)] beside the expected slow institutionalization of the proactively shifted paradigm 








Table 14: Four Possible Outcomes of the 2nd Game 
                                  Implementer 
Formulator  
Implement the privatization 
policy 
Not/Slowly implement the 
privatization policy 
Privatization towards market 
economy 
Ownership structure changed 
towards the market economy 
 
Privatization process slow  
 
Privatization in central 
planning manner, market 
economy as label only 
Privatization process driven by 
implementer's motivation  
 
Status quo of inefficiency 
  
 
It should be noted that the route from (3) to (2) to (1) is Vietnam's "shortcut" paradigm shift model as 
reflected in the preceding game of "Paradigm Choice". However, the existence of (4) cannot be 
excluded, given the payoffs to the players involved: As the new paradigm has already been claimed to 
be adopted officially, the formulator – Player C – has neither incentive to focus on it nor punishment for 
not incorporating it into the policy and could have similar payoffs as the case he mainstreams the new 
paradigm into the policy; the implementer – Player D – has second-mover advantage as he can 
observe the strategy of the formulator and can choose either strategy d1 or d2 if Player C has strategy 
c1 and can choose strategy d1 if Player C chooses strategy c2, so that he can avoid the bad outcome of 
(3). 
Table 15: Player D’s Second-Mover Advantage 
Player C                            Player D strategy d1 [probability q] strategy d2 [probability (1-q)] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,1 







That is, the probability that Player D chooses strategy d1 equals to the probability that Player C 
chooses strategy c2. 
q = 1 – p   
The matrix can be rewritten as: 
Table 16: 2nd Game Matrix When q = 1 - p 
Player C                            Player D strategy d1 [probability (1-p)] strategy d2 [probability p] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,1 
strategy c2 [probability (1-p) 1,1  0,0 
 
To solve for the maximum of the payoff, we have: 
Total average payoff = p*1*(1-p)*1 + (1-p)*1*(1-p)*1 + p*1*p*1 + (1-p)*0*p*0 
                                      = p*(1-p) + (1-p)2 + p2  
                                      = 1 + (1-p)2 
The highest payoff is obtained when p = 1.  
The closer to 1 that p is, the higher the payoff is obtained.  
In other words, the higher the level of mainstreaming of the new paradigm into the policy is, the 
higher the outcome that is yielded. 
In short, game theory analysis has helped to explain the differences between Vietnam's Proactive 
Paradigm Shift and Hall's Paradigm Shift Model: (a) the proactive “paradigm choice” by Player A (the 
government) is the rational choice and results in a Nash equilibrium from a pure strategy in the 
“Paradigm Choice” game; (b) the incremental change is part of the mixed strategy solution to the 
“Formulator - Implementer Interactions” game. 
However, the game theory analysis leaves two aspects to be further investigated: (1) evidence of the 
probability that the new paradigm is not mainstreamed into the policy by policy formulator, and (2) 
evidence that the outcome is driven by the implementer's agenda, unlikely towards the new paradigm. 
In the case of SOE privatization in Vietnam, the half-way mainstreaming of the market economy 
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paradigm into policy (in a centrally-planned manner) has been officially acknowledged by Vietnam's 
unique orientation of a "socialist-oriented market economy".  
The next part (3.3) will give some examples of the cases in which the privatization process is driven by 
the implementer's agenda that creates opportunities for corruption in the privatization process in the 
forms of misappropriation, under-pricing, internal dealings and others. The next section (4. The 
"Proactive Paradigm Shift" Games in Vietnam's Anti-corruption Policy) will test the generalizability of 
the game theory matrixes in the case of Vietnam's proactive paradigm shift in corruption control: (1) 
whether the “Paradigm Choice” and “Formulator - Implementer Interactions” games can be applied to 
the paradigm shift  in corruption control and the rationale for such applicability, (2) evidence of the 
cases where the corruption control paradigm is not mainstreamed into policy making (through the 
case of lack of corruption control in healthcare socialization) and the consequences of such cases. 
 
3.3. 2nd Game 4th Quarter: Corruption in SOE Equitization in Vietnam 
In the SOE privatization process, the "pro-market" paradigm to be mainstreamed would be: 1) 
reducing the State ownership; 2) mobilizing capital from the private sector and 3) improving the 
corporate governance for privatized enterprises. However, the policy formulator has little incentives 
and/or awareness of the need to mainstream the pro-market paradigm, which has been officially 
claimed as the Government's proactive reform in planning to restructure the SOEs. Meanwhile, the 
new resources that arise in the privatization process include the proceedings from selling State's assets 
in the privatized SOEs and accumulate at the implementer's level, not at the formulator's level, and 
can be an important consideration/incentive for the implementer. Besides, the resources that could be 
created if the pro-market paradigm is mainstreamed into the privatization policy can also be significant 
incentives for the implementer to carry out the policy: ownership and the link between investment in 
the enterprise and improved corporate governance. The incentives for the players can be summed up 











Table 17: Incentives for Players in the “Formulator - Implementer Interactions” Game 
Players Incentives in choosing strategies Likelihood of presence of incentives 
C power that will arise after the 
implementation process (e.g. political will to 
mainstream new paradigm into policy) 
not much (because: the tie between policy 
formulator Player C and proactive paradigm 
adopter Player A in the macro "Paradigm 
Choice" game is close and the paradigm has 
been claimed to be adopted --> there is no 
threat of Player A - C team being defeated 
because of the paradigm being taken as the 
challenging force by Player B in the macro 
"Paradigm Choice" game.) 
C power that arise during the implementation 
process 
not much (Player C has first-mover 
disadvantage as Player C finishes the 
formulation before the implementation 
stage by Player D, but Player C faces little 
challenge from Player D as Player D is not 
like Play B against Player A in the macro 
game, but more or less in the same "team" 
under Player A.) 
D resources that will arise after the 
implementation process (e.g. ownership and 
the link between investment in the enterprise 
and improved corporate governance) 
depending on the level of mainstreaming of 
the new pro-market paradigm into the 
policy 
D resources that arise during the 
implementation process (e.g. proceedings 
from State assets) 
second-mover advantage (depending on the 
observation of the situation once the policy 




Thus, when the actual privatization takes place, the implementer has the opportunity to implement 
the policy in a way that benefits himself and capitalizes on the lack of focus on the new paradigm to be 
mainstreamed. That is, if the policy lacks focus on ownership, state revenues from privatization, and 
corporate governance in ways that might benefit the implementer right during the implementation 
process, then the implementer has the incentives not to slow down the privatization (like might be the 
case if the privatization policy is transparent) but to carry out the process in ways that gives him rents 
from the process (that is, to choose strategy d1 instead of d2).  
In this "Formulator - Implementer Interaction" game, the combination of strategy c2 by Player C and 
strategy d1 by Player D in cases where Player D is motivated by resources in the implementation 
process instead of those after the implementation process would result in corruption in privatization. 
 It should be noted that  Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability  
(Klitgaard’s simple heuristic formula for analysing the tendency for corruption to exist)83 
All the M, D and -A factors are present in the 2nd game of “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” 
because Player D has second-mover advantage and also the "team" advantage as both Player C and 
Player D are in the "team" with Player A – paradigm adopter in the macro Paradigm Choice game.  
This is what has been happening in the process of SOE equitization in Vietnam with various corruption 
forms of underpricing, internal dealings and others. 
According to Dr Nguyen Van Nam, former member of the Prime Minister's Advisory Research Team84, 
many SOEs are "enthusiastic" in carrying out equitization not because of the motivation in meeting the 
political mandate or for corporate governance improvement, but because of the opportunities to seize 
some part of the State assets85. 
According to Pham Huu Nghi (researcher at Institute of the Government and Law (in Vietnam's 
Institute of Social Sciences)86, the value of the land use rights was not included in the evaluation of 
some equitized SOEs, which made the price of the enterprise shares at the initial public offering only 
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one eighth of what it should be with the value of land use rights, reducing the State budget revenue 
from share sales by at least 8 times.  
The reason for such low evaluation is the unclear ownership system as the State property, which is 
defined as "belonging to all the people", does not really have specific owners to care for.  For example, 
Phu Gia Hotel, located near the famous Sword Lake of Hanoi, was evaluated at VND  3.5 billion when it 
was privatized, but this figure did not include the value of the land use rights of the 6000 m2 area, 
which was evaluated at VND 50 billion at that time. The land value of Ho Tay Shrimp Cake Shop, which 
has a large area in a profitable location in Hanoi, was evaluated at less than VND 1 billion, much lower 
than its true value, with the value of land use rights being at least VND 10 billion.87 Trang Tien Hotel, 
located at the centre of Hanoi, was evaluated at VND 4 billion while its land value only was estimated 
to be at least twice that amount.88  
Beside the corruption form of underpricing of State assets in SOEs to be privatized, there have been 
fraud cases in which some individuals swindled the State budget in the pre-privatized SOEs. For 
example, between 2003 and 2006, Nguyen Bi, Chairman of the Board of Directors and CEO and Nguyen 
Thanh Huyen, Deputy CEO and Chief Accountant of Vifon Company in Ho Chi Minh city faked receipts 
of the company's revenues and expenditures during the company's equitization process and pocketed 
more than VND 24 billion.89 
It should be noted that the equitization of the SOEs with problems of corruption as mentioned above 
was driven by the opportunities to seize public assets. In cases that such incentives are not present 
(due to good monitoring mechanism, for example) while the market incentives are also absent 
because the pro-market paradigm is not mainstreamed into the policy, then Player D will be more 
inclined to slow down the implementation of the privatization policy, that is, to choose strategy d2. 
According to Dr. Vo Tri Thanh (Deputy Director of Central Institute of Economic Management), the 
imposition of dual objectives on SOEs (profit and state ownership) might be a factor to slow down the 
privatization process.90 
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Many investors have expected the equitization of Hapro (Hanoi Trade Company), a leading commercial 
SOE owning hundreds of sale outlets in prime location in Hanoi, as Hapro has businesses in goods 
distribution and retailing, food catering, tours, commercial infrastructure, etc., which are business lines 
that do not require State intervention. Hapro has been planned for equitization for more than 5 years 
but has yet to be privatized. According to the Charter of Organization and Operation of Hapro that was 
approved by Hanoi's People's Committee in August 2012, Hanoi's People's Committee continues to be 
the owner of Hapro to carry out the owner's rights and responsibilities of the owner of the general 
corporation.91  
The lack of mainstreaming of the "pro-market" paradigm (change in ownership, improved corporate 
governance) in cases like the plan to equitize Hapro is likely to lead to the third quarter of the status 
quo, whereby the Player C pays little attention to turn the new paradigm into policy (as according to 
the "pro-market" paradigm, a commercial enterprise need not be controlled by the State) – strategy 
c2, and the implementer Player D does not have the incentive to adopt strategy d1, but choose 
strategy d2 instead. Recently, Hapro, still an SOE, asked for a further privilege (a "special mechanism") 
in usage of location to avoid competition with enterprises in the market.92 
In short, the lack of mainstreaming of the new paradigm into the policy (strategy c2 by Player C) is 
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Table 18: Incentives for Formulators and Implementers in SOE Equitization in Vietnam 
Players Incentives in choosing strategies Likelihood of presence of incentives 
C power that will arise after the 
implementation process  
no direct contestation --> strategy c2 
C power that arise during the implementation 
process 
little --> strategy c2 
D resources that will arise after the 
implementation process  
If sufficient (Player C's strategy c1) --> then 
strategy d1 
If lacking (Player C's strategy c2) --> strategy 
then d2 --> next round of game whereby Player 
C formulates new policy --> slow pace 
D resources that arise during the 
implementation process 
If chance for private gains (corruption) --> 
strategy d1 
If no chance for private gains --> consider 
resources after implementation as analyzed 
above 
 
It should be noted that because of the “Paradigm Choice” game that preceded the “Formulator – 
Implementer Interactions” game, in Vietnam the government remained the same one led by the 
Communist Party – not an alternation of left-centre and right-centre governments as in the case of 
Hungary. The post-Antall governments then acted as Player A in the Vietnam case with the “Paradigm 
Choice”, however, the “Paradigm Choice” game cannot be applied to these governments because by 
then each and every government was committed to the pro-market paradigm and mere “claim” of a 
“market economy orientation” would not give these post-Antall coalitions the same weight as what 
Antall had in the first election with Nemeth’s coalition. The “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” 
game can be applied to post-Antall government’s privatization policy, however there are some 
differences from the Vietnam case. In the Hungary case, because of the pressures of the short terms 
between elections, Player C would not want to consider the option of going to the next round of game 
as when the game is repeated, the player could be a new Player C (if the opposition coalition wins the 
election). That is, the incentives for Player C to mainstream the pro-market paradigm into privatization 
policy in the Hungary case would be much stronger than those in the case of Vietnam. Also, Player D in 
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the Hungary case would not have the consideration of “if incentives for resources in privatization are 
insufficient then wait for the next rounds of games” but would exercise their pressures on Player C to 
have their immediate gains.  
 
Table 19: Incentives for Formulators and Implementers in Privatization in Hungary 
Players Incentives in choosing strategies Likelihood of presence of incentives 
C power that will arise after the 
implementation process  
Not a major consideration due to election 
pressure --> focus more on current term as 
analyzed below 
C power that arise during the implementation 
process 
Much --> strategy c1 plus interactions with 
Player D 
D resources that will arise after the 
implementation process  
If sufficient --> then strategy d1 
If lacking --> consider resources during the 
process as analyzed below or pressure Player 
C for change 
D resources that arise during the 
implementation process 
If chance for private gains (corruption) --> 
strategy d1 
If no chance for private gains --> consider 
resources after implementation as analyzed 
above or pressure Player C for change 
 
Thus, the adjustment of the 2nd game of “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” can explain the 
faster pace of privatization which was ridden with corruption cases in Hungary in particular and in 
transitional countries in general. Much has been written about this situation. Corruption in 
privatization in transitional countries has been briefly captured by the quote that Daniel Kaufmann and 
Paul Siegelbaum put in their article on “Privatization and Corruption in Transition Economies”: “If you 
think privatization is corrupt, try without it.” (Anonymous official, in response to the Ukrainian 
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parliament’s decision to halt the privatization program on the grounds of possible corrupt methods, 
1994)93 
In Vietnam, corruption in SOE equitization became a serious problem and received much attention 
from the regulators. The 2005 Anti-corruption Law has a whole article to regulate this issue. 
Article 19.- Publicity and transparency in the equitization of state enterprises 
1. The equitization of state enterprises must be public and transparent; must not be conducted 
in a self-contained manner within the enterprises. Equitized enterprises shall have to publicize 
their actual financial status upon their valuation. 
2. Competent state agencies shall have to publicize the values of equitized enterprises and the 
adjustment (if any) of enterprise value. 
3. The first-time sale of equities of equitized enterprises must be conducted by auction. 
However, the existence of this Article 19 within the Anti-corruption Law is merely a reaction to the 
problems arising in the privatization process, which have deeper roots in the whole process of 
paradigm shift during the privatization process. The proactive paradigm shift by Vietnam’s government 
could help prevent the authority fragmentation and contestation stages in Hall’s Paradigm Shift model 
that has proved logical in other contexts in the first game of “Paradigm Choice”, but it could not 
prevent the problems in the second game of “Formulator – Implementer Interactions”. Although the 
privatization pace was faster in Hungary (and many other transitional countries) and slow in Vietnam, 
corruption in privatization is the common issue. Corruption in privatization is inevitable given the rules 
of the game – both the “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” game for the Vietnam case analyzed 
in the previous part and the game with adjusted incentives for the Hungary case. The ineffectiveness 
of corruption control in privatization is linked to the lack of mainstreaming of the pro-market paradigm 
into the privatization policy making in the whole process of paradigm shift via privatization. 
Vietnam seems to have targeted at the bigger picture of the corruption issue – with corruption in 
privatization as only one issue within a range of corruption issues – with the adoption of the Anti-
corruption Law in 2005. However, whether the specific issues of corruption, such as corruption in 
privatization, can be dealt with via the implementation of this Law seems to be linked to the overall 
pattern of paradigm shift in corruption control. The repetition of Vietnam’s own pattern of paradigm 
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shift (as modeled in the previous section in the paradigm shift towards the market economy) in 
corruption control will be explored in the next section. 
 
4. The "Proactive Paradigm Shift" Games in Vietnam's Anti-corruption Policy 
4.1. Game-Theory-Based Models and Hypotheses 
As in the analysis in the previous section, I argue that Vietnam has its own pattern of paradigm shift 
that is a shortcut to avoid the stages of authority fragmentation and contestation as compared to 
Hall's paradigm shift model. This results in a "Proactive Paradigm Shift" game consisting of a one-off 
"Paradigm Choice" game at the macro level and repeated "Formulator - Implementer Interactions" 
games at the micro level. The shortcut is a Nash-equilibrium of pure strategies whereby the 
government proactively adopts a new paradigm that can guide policies better than the prevailing 
paradigm that has revealed many shortcomings and by so doing retains its power.  
 
Table 20: Matrix of the “Paradigm Choice” Game in Vietnam’s Proactive Paradigm Shift 
Player A                            Player B Old paradigm New paradigm 
Old paradigm 0,0 0,1 
New paradigm 1,0 2,1 
 
However, what happens in the process of policy formulation and implementation is different from the 
"Paradigm Choice" game. The payoffs to the players involved are different from those in the first one-
off game. This "Formulator - Implementer Interactions" game does not have a pure-strategy Nash 








Table 21: Four Possible Outcomes in “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” Game in Vietnam’s 
Proactive Paradigm Shift 
                    Implementer 
Formulator 
implement formulated policy not implement formulated policy 
mainstream new paradigm into 
formulated policy 
effective policy towards new 
paradigm direction 
incremental change towards new 
paradigm direction 
not mainstream new paradigm 
into formulated policy 
outcome driven by 
implementer's agenda, not 
towards new paradigm 
status quo of unsolved problems 
 
The solution to this game is a mixed strategy depending on p (the probability that Player C adopts 
strategy c1). This solution is based on the observation that the probability that Player D chooses 
strategy d1 is the same as the probability that Player C chooses strategy c2 because Player D has 
second-mover advantage to avoid the worse outcome (if choosing strategy d2 once Player C has 
already chosen strategy c2). 
 
Table 22: Matrix of the “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” Game in Vietnam’s Proactive 
Paradigm Shift 
Player C                            Player D strategy d1 [probability (1-p)] strategy d2 [probability p] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,1 
strategy c2 [probability (1-p) 1,1  0,0 
 
This section will test the model in Vietnam's paradigm shift in corruption control.  
The hypotheses are (1) the corruption control paradigm shift that Vietnam is undergoing also follows 
the "Proactive Paradigm Shift" games that have been explored in the previous section with the one-off 
macro level "Paradigm Choice" game and the repeated micro level "Formulator - Implementer 
Interactions" game. (2) the probability that Player C chooses strategy c2 also exists in the corruption 
control game (the case when the new corruption control paradigm is not mainstreamed into the policy 
making process at the micro level). 
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Section 4.2 will provide evidence of the proactive paradigm shift pattern in corruption control in 
Vietnam in the last two decades. Section 4.3 will provide evidence of the cases when the corruption 
control paradigm is not mainstreamed into healthcare socialization policy in Vietnam in the recent 
decade. 
 
4.2. Vietnam’s Proactive Paradigm Shift in Anti-corruption Policy 
More than two decades after Vietnam began to open up its economy to the world economy with its 
"doi moi" (renovation) policy, the country enjoys significant initial success from economic reforms. 
However, corruption has been endemic and "although government efforts to curb graft evidenced 
some success [...], most observers agreed eliminating corruption among Vietnamese officials would 
require far-reaching changes".94 
Vietnam's fight against corruption seems to be a main focus of the country for the time being. Vietnam 
signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption in December 2003 and endorsed the ADB-
OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific in June 2004. The country's Anti-corruption Law 
was approved by the National Assembly on November 29, 2005 and went into effect on June 1, 2006. 
The Resolution on National Anti-corruption Strategy by 2020 (No.21/NQ-CP) was signed by the Prime 
Minister on 12 May 2009. The Anti-corruption Law was revised in November 2012 to take effect in 
February 2013. 
The logics behind anti-corruption policy in general and the proactive adoption of Vietnam’s anti-
corruption policy in particular have similarities with the "Proactive Paradigm Shift" model analyzed in 
the previous section. In similar pattern to the way the “open door” policy was proactively adopted 
with the goal of building a “socialist-oriented market economy”, now the government is attempting to 
police itself.  On the one hand, such proactive paradigm shift might be the result of policy learning as a 
form of late-comer advantage. On the other hand, the lack of fragmentation of power and 
contestation of the political actors driving the ideas behind such policy change is likely to result in the 
slow pace of institutionalization of the idea and other problems in the implementation of the policy. 
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4.2.1. Signal of a Paradigm Shift 
The approval of the Anti-corruption Law seems to be a significant step in anti-corruption efforts in 
Vietnam. The Resolution on National Anti-corruption Strategy by 2020 (No.21/NQ-CP) dated 12 May 
2009 seems to further show high level of anti-corruption political will. In terms of policy ideas, the last 
five years seem to be a milestone in anti-corruption policy. 
Vietnam’s Anti-corruption Law has a comprehensive design that includes elements vital to corruption 
combat and prevention. In terms of conformation to international law and convention, Vietnam’s Anti-
corruption Law seems by and large to adequately cover compliance with the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption and to take into account the principles of the ADB-OECD Anti-
Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific.95 Also, the Law has incorporated major anti-corruption 
strategies that deal with different aspects of the phenomenon as envisaged by several theoretical 
frameworks.  
According to Fritzen (2006)96, there are three main groups of anti-corruption strategies: administrative 
reform; oversight and inspection; and transparency and complaints. This categorization approach 
focuses on policy actions. According to Klitgaard (1988)97, there are five major anti-corruption 
strategies: choose the agents; change rewards and penalties; change the structure of principal-
agent-client relationship; change attitudes towards corruption; collect and analyze information. This 
categorization approach revolves around "policy change-focus". Vietnam's Anti-corruption Law and 
supporting legal documents are comprehensive and cover each and every aspect of these frameworks. 
1. "Right agents": mandate definition of the codes of conduct for the public officials; mandate 
transparency in the operation and activities of public organizations, personnel recruitment and other 
aspects (similar to Fritzen's transparency categorization).  
2. "Due rewards and penalties": mandate definition of remunerations in public organizations; define 
corrupt behaviors and penalties for such behaviors; define the responsibilities of the heads of public 
organizations in case of uncovered corruption. 
3. "Right relation" between the state, public organizations and public service recipients: promulgate 
the rights and duties of citizens and the responsibilities and authorities of relevant entities (e.g. 
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Steering Board on Corruption Prevention and Combat, the National Assembly, People's Committees, 
etc.) in anti-corruption efforts (similar to Fritzen's oversight categorization); define the citizens' rights 
to make complaints and expose corruption (similar to Fritzen's complaints categorization); mandate 
financial and technical audits and inspection; define inspection measures (similar to Fritzen's 
inspection categorization); mandate administrative procedure improvements (technology, payment 
methods) to prevent corruption; mandate public administration reform to enhance the independence 
and accountability of public organizations; mandate centre-local delineation of public management; 
mandate clarification of duties and authority inside and among public organizations; mandate 
transparency and simplification of administrative procedures (similar to Fritzen's administrative 
reform categorization).  
4. "Right attitudes" towards corruption: define the role and responsibility of the society (e.g. The 
Fatherland Front, the press, enterprises, business and professional associations, etc.) in preventing and 
combating corruption (the whole Chapter VI of the Anti-corruption Law). 
5. "Necessary information" to be collected and analyzed: promulgate the rights of public 
organizations, political, socio-political organizations, the press and citizens to require relevant entities 
for access to information on the activities of their organizations; mandate disclosure of reports on 
corruption prevention and combat; mandate asset disclosure by certain groups of public officials 
(cutting across Fritzen's both oversight/inspection and transparency categorization).  
Also, Vietnam's anti-corruption policies seem to incorporate elements of the three main approaches to 
contemporary anti-corruption strategies: mass public opinion/civic culture perspectives; economic 
analyses; and institutional viewpoints98.  
The institutional viewpoint looks either to strengthening institutions, such as the auditor-general or 
anti-corruption agency functions, or controls and procedures within institutions, such as codes and 
register of interests, to delineate the expectations of politicians and public officials99. Vietnam's anti-
corruption policies now already include elements in this institutional viewpoint approach, as reflected 
in the measures listed above. 
With more focus on not only the behaviors but also the interactions among the parties involved, 
economic analyses prioritize the “principal-agent” relationship to identify corruption and anti-
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corruption strategies. Authors like Klitgaard pay attention to the principal-agent-client relationships: a 
principal (an individual who is in charge of carrying out a public function, representing the 
government), an agent (an individual who actually performs the operation of the agency, for example 
an official), and a client (a private individual with whom the agent interacts). As analyzed above, 
Vietnam's Anti-corruption Law already incorporates elements that would fit this economic analysis 
approach. 
As far as the civic culture perspective is concerned, this approach is based on the perception of the 
social or cultural context of corruption and its focus is on mass attitudinal change or civic awareness 
anti-corruption strategies. This approach has been used extensively by Vietnamese leaders in showing 
political will to fight corruption. Much propaganda has been in place with such terms as the “anti-
corruption spirit”, “anti-corruption consensus”, “anti-corruption wholeheartedness”, and corruption 
has been referred to as “national disaster”, “internal invaders”, etc. 
From these perspectives, Vietnam's anti-corruption policy has a comprehensive design, incorporating 
key contents and approaches that are deemed fundamental in fighting and preventing corruption.  
In terms of ideas, the Anti-corruption Law seems to be a great paradigm shift that is similar to 
Vietnam’s renovation policy in the mid-1980s. The renovation policy signaled a shift from a centrally-
planned economy in which the government decides all economic activities to a market economy in 
which the market can decide what, how and for whom to produce. The anti-corruption policy signaled 
a shift from the paradigm that the government is by ideological default clean to the paradigm that the 
government is clean only if corruption is eliminated and prevented. However, whether this seemingly 
paradigm shift has taken place needs to be further observed. 
 
4.2.2. Slow Pace of Change  
The anti-corruption paradigm has yet to institutionalize itself as not much of the anti-corruption policy 
has been implemented. There is a large gap between anti-corruption strategies stipulated in the Anti-
corruption Law and the motivation of the implementers involved to implement the measures to 
prevent or expose corruption. 
For example, to carry out the policy action of "inspection" with the policy change-focus of "relation" 
(according to the analyses in the previous section), financial and technical audits and inspections need 
to be in place properly, as mandated by the Anti-corruption Law. However, the enforcement agencies 
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– the state inspectorate and the technical audit divisions within line agencies – have several reasons 
not to implement this policy effectively, if at all. Even if these agencies have a strong anti-corruption 
will and exert their maximum efforts, they have weak capacity and technical resources, lack 
coordination and even have to cope with corruption within their own agencies.100 In a famous case, 
PMU18, the Project Management Unit of mega transport projects with many officials with links to 
higher level personnel in Ministry of Transport which was believed by the public to be involved in 
corruption and bribery, underwent 10 different inspections (by various inspection agencies such as by 
Ministry of Transport, financial inspection agencies at various levels, Government Inspectorate, annual 
audits, etc.) which had uncovered neither corruption nor bribery.101 It is therefore no surprise that in 
the current institutional set-up, efforts to implement the "inspection" policy action are not likely to 
tune the public organizations in the executive towards the policy change-focus of enhancing the 
transparency and accountability of these agencies in the relation with the state and with public service 
recipients.  
Another intended policy action – "administrative reform" – towards the policy change-focus of 
"relation" is also facing a major setback. With the current unclear task delegation and authority 
decentralization, as well as weak coordination mechanism among the agencies, it is still ambiguous to 
visualize the implementation of Article 57 of the Anti-corruption Law – "Enhancing the application of 
science and technology in public administration" – which is aimed at reducing contact between public 
service recipients and public officials. In April 2007, a national project on modernizing and 
computerization of the public administration – Project 112 – was scrapped by the Prime Minister for 
"failing to fulfill its assigned tasks"102. That was not only due to the low capability of the 
implementers103 but also because of the overlapping in the project management. According to Tuoi tre 
(4 April 2007)104, the executive steering committee (with representatives from Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Science and Technology and 
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ironically not Ministry of Post and Telecommunications105), which did not have state administration 
functions in information technology, carried out technical and financial evaluation and instructed 
similar evaluation by the local steering boards, thus act as a regulator who regulates himself106. Also, 
the coordination among the agencies and localities involved in the project was poor. Ministries and 
local authorities developed their own action plans, which were neither systematic nor synchronized. 
Financial audits and inspection were not in place, and one year after the first phase of the project 
(2001-2005; the intended second phase was 2006-2010) there was still no report of the 
accomplishments of the project. In short, it is unlikely that the strategy that is aimed at preventing 
corruption by digital administrative reform can succeed if it is implemented by those who neither have 
incentives nor face checks and balances to carry it out. 
The implementation of the asset disclosure requirement also points to several institutional constraints 
that hinder the success of the current anti-corruption strategy. The Anti-corruption Law states that 
public employees, especially those managing state assets and dealing with organizations and 
individuals, have to declare all the properties owned by them and their family. However, even if public 
officials provide the required information, it would be difficult to verify such information. According to 
Pham Van Chung (2005)107, in each declaration session, the public officials and employees are each 
given by their organizations a dossier listing all items to declare, which they then fill and submit to the 
organizations; the preciseness of the information submitted is then not properly verified by and there 
is no feedback from the organizations. In order for the disclosure strategy to have impact, these asset 
declarations need to be reviewed. 108 However, the agencies in charge are under-resourced, and the 
civil society is weak, and both have little incentive to get access to and use such information to guard 
the public officials off corruptive behaviors. According to ADB (2005), “although [asset] declarations 
were made, there was apparently no meaningful follow-up to verify accuracy and truthfulness, and on 
the whole the system seems be observed more in the breach”109. In that sense, the implementation of 
asset declarations is expected to be only symbolic and falls short of reaching the policy change-focus of 
providing necessary information to relevant entities, thus has little impact on corruption prevention 
and combat. 
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It is therefore not surprising that there has not been any significant change in the assessment by 
Global Integrity of Vietnam’s ranking of 2006, 2009 and 2011. Vietnam received an overall “Very 
Weak” rating in both 2006 and 2009 Global Integrity Index and similarly low scores in both 2009 and 
2011110 by Global Integrity, which assesses national anti-corruption policies and practices in countries 
around the world. 
 
Table 23: Vietnam Global Integrity Ratings 
 2006111 2009112 2011113 
Category Overall 
Rating 
Overall Rating Score Score 
Civil Society, Public 
Information and Media 
Very Weak Very Weak 22 21 
Elections Very Weak Very Weak 43 32 
Government Accountability Very Weak Very Weak 33 34 
Administration and Civil 
Service 
Very Weak Very Weak 42 48 
Oversight and Regulation Very Weak Very Weak 60 63 
Anti-Corruption and Rule of 
Law 
Weak Weak 65 66 
(source: Global Integrity website) 
 
From the data by Transparency International, Vietnam’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score and 
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Table 24: Transparency International Ranking of Vietnam, 2005 – 2012 
Year CPI score Ranking/number of countries 
2005 2.6/10 107/158 
2006 2.6/10 111/163 
2007 2.6/10 123/179 
2008 2.7/10 121/180 
2009 2.7/10 120/180 
2010 2.7/10 116/178 
2011 2.9/10 112/182 
2012 3.1/10 123/176 
(source: Transparency International website114) 
 
Vietnam also recognizes the slow pace of implementing the Anti-corruption Law. There has been 
considerable media coverage criticizing that not much has been done in corruption uncovering and 
prevention. In 2010, Deputy Minister Truong Vinh Trong acknowledged that “although fighting 
corruption is feasible, anti-corruption efforts so far have yet to bring about fundamental change”.115 In 
2012, Communist Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong said that “the cause in corruption control 
and wastage prevention has not yet achieved expected results”.116 
Further steps to accelerate the pace of anti-corruption policy implementation are therefore required. 
On 12 May 2009, Resolution No.21/NQ-CP of the Government detailed the National Anti-corruption 
Strategy by 2020 in three stages: (1) From 2009 to 2011, (2) From 2011 to 2016, and (3) From 2016 to 
2020. A plan was included, with focus on: specific contents of solutions/missions (for example on 
enhancing transparency in planning, policy making, regulations and implementation, enhancing the 
quality of delivering public service, completing economic management mechanism, building a business 
environment with fair competition and transparency, enhancing quality of inspection and auditing, 
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investigation and trial of corruption cases, enhancing social awareness and participation in anti-
corruption efforts, etc.), expected results (for example projects, draft laws, decisions, reports, 
resolutions, plans etc. on specified aspects), governmental bodies in charge (for example Ministry of 
Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Information and 
Telecommunications, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Government Inspectorate, 
Government Office, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Public Administration, Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, State Bank of Vietnam, Provincial People’s Committees, etc.), the 
date by which the results are expected, and government bodies of issuance or final approval. It is in 
essence a plan for relevant governmental bodies to do their assigned part of anti-corruption measures 
within their mandate and in coordination with each other. It should be noted that this kind of detailed 
planning is typical of Vietnam’s central planning in carrying out policies in all aspects, not only anti-
corruption policy. 
The Anti-corruption Law was revised in November 2012 to go into effect on 1 February 2013 with 
revisions in various aspects and the change of the head of the Anti-corruption Steering Committee 
from the Prime Minister to the Communist Party Secretary General. 
The Resolution and the Revised Law seem to confirm Vietnam’s Government’s and the Communist 
Party’s high political will to fight corruption. However, it also signals that the Anti-corruption Law is not 
the milestone in anti-corruption efforts as it has been expected. The paradigm shift signaled by the 
approval of the Anti-corruption Law does not seem to have set roots. Theoretical discussion using the 
“Proactive Paradigm Shift” games in the previous section will help to explain the situation observed 
and predict the courses of policy change in the time to come. 
 
4.2.3. Vietnam’s Proactive Paradigm Shift in Anti-corruption Policy 
Looking back, the renovation policy proclaimed in 1986 was a great milestone in Vietnam’s change 
towards the market economy paradigm. However, not much immediate change took place right after 
that milestone in the few years in the late 1980s, which was different from the great political instability 
and chaos in Eastern European countries at that time. Similarly, not much change in anti-corruption 
results has taken place in the last five years since the approval of Vietnam’s Anti-corruption Law. 
However, the Law might have been a milestone in anti-corruption policy in the way that the open-door 
policy was in 1986, as there are many similarities in the pattern of proactive paradigm shifts and the 
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paradigms involved. It is likely that a gradual change will occur by accumulation of policy experiments 
that are designed not only to deal with the corruption problem but also to avoid authority 
fragmentation and contestation.  
It should be noted that the idea of a paradigm shift and the Paradigm Shift Model can be applied in 
cases where the impact of the crisis situation (anomaly) is viewed as so great that makes actors try to 
seek new solutions beyond the current paradigm, and accept that their political tenure is not decided 
by the faithfulness to the old paradigm but by the level of public perception of their effectiveness in 
dealing with policy problems. Anti-corruption issue is a problem of great urgency, as the legitimacy of a 
government that is viewed as corrupt is seriously challenged. By adopting the Anti-corruption Law, 
Vietnam government already underwent a significant step in the paradigm shift by replacing the old 
idea that the government is by ideological default clean (under the guidance of the Communist Party) 
to the new idea that the government is clean only if corruption is eliminated and prevented. This is a 
step as significant as recognizing the role of the market after decades of central planning. 
It should also be noted that Hall’s 6-stage Paradigm Shift Model emphasizes the role of actors in the 
combination of ideas, actors and institutions (the actor who wins in the political contestation will 
institutionalize the idea that came as experimentation before being adopted by the actor). It has 
several assumptions the violation of which can lead to a different pattern of change, such as Vietnam’s 
proactive paradigm shift pattern. First, the premise for the fourth and fifth stages is the institution of 
democracy, so that actors in the policy community beyond the incumbent government have more or 
less equal footing with the incumbent in advocating their viewpoints. Second, the incumbent authority 
do not view that undermining the old paradigm is synonymous with destabilizing its own legitimacy 
and have policy experiments that give rise to the new paradigm and the opportunity for the opposition 
to back the new paradigm and topple the incumbent. Third, the paradigm itself is driven by the 
political will and is not well developed at the time it is adopted as the new framework guiding policy 
making (in the contestation stage, before the institutionalization stage). 
Vietnam’s government has a slow pace of anti-corruption policy change in the way it had the slow 
march to the socialist-oriented market economy. The 6-stage, relatively quick paradigm shift is again 
collapsed into the 4-stage, relatively slow paradigm shift that has been proactively claimed before it 




First of all, the application of the 4-stage paradigm shift is relevant to anti-corruption issue because 
again, the three assumptions for the 6-stage paradigm shift are likely to be violated, leading to the 
collapse of the fourth and fifth stages.  
As regards the first assumption on political participation and contestation, incumbent government can 
avoid contestation and keep its position by developing and emphasizing its ownership of the new 
paradigm that arises from its policy experiments that already challenged the old paradigms. Vietnam’s 
government is trying to project the image that anti-corruption efforts are started by the government 
and not by other actors in the policy community. A possible reason for its ability to nullify the 
contestation assumption is that it has somehow been “vaccinated” against this possibility in the past. 
In other words, the government can draw on its past experience to avoid contestation by claiming 
ownership to the new paradigm that was revealed earlier in a previous incident. 
This pattern of own experience learning seems to have happened long before the renovation policy in 
the mid-1980s. According to Fforde and de Vylder, a process of bottom-up reform (e.g. introduction of 
output contracts in agricultural and industrial production) might have taken place in the period of 1981 
– 85, preceding the government’s proactive decision to adopt the renovation policy.117 That 
“agricultural output contract” experiment was based on the idea from a previous policy experiment: 
assigning (though unofficially) ownership of land use rights to farmers in agricultural collectives in the 
late 1960s in a northern province in Vietnam – Phu Tho. Under central planning paradigm, there was 
no private ownership of means of production and farmers worked together on collectives’ land. 
However, the production yield was very low though Vietnamese farmers had a long tradition of being 
industrious and the resources were comparatively favorable. Kim Ngoc, a party leader in Phu Tho in 
1968, tried to solve the problem by advocating a policy experimentation in which farmers were given 
the rights to work on assigned land as if the land belonged to individual households. Many 
cooperatives contracted farming activities to peasant households, which gradually eroded the 
collective mode. The experiment led to a significant increase in agricultural yield in the province. 
However, after several years of experimentation, the central party recognized that the rationale 
behind that reform was against the socialist ideal of collective property rights. “The practice then was 
mostly carried out in a covert way, hence the name ‘illicit contract’”.118  
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In the mid-1980s, in the context of overall inefficiency in the economy and the observable positive 
results of underground agricultural land right reform in various provinces (that continued after the 
halted policy experimentation), the government decided to adopt the renovation policy119, including, 
among others, legalizing the assignment of agricultural land use rights to farmers, and building the 
legal foundation for the development of the private economic sector, which later facilitated the 
privatization of SOEs. These official policy experiments are then expanded to other areas, leading to 
the shift to the socialist-oriented market economy. 
A similar vaccination for the anti-corruption policy also happened before the adoption of the Anti-
corruption Law. In 1996, people in Thai Binh province in the North of Vietnam had mass 
demonstrations against local government officials because they were discontent with decisions 
concerning land allocation, fee and charge levy, compulsory labor requirement, and corruption 
committed by local cadres. This grassroots organized and goal-oriented disturbance raised great 
concern to the government and this lesson might have prompted the government to have a paradigm 
shift patterned after the renovation policy, claiming proactive reform to retain legitimacy and 
establishing ownership of the reform idea from this incident.  
As regards the second assumption on unintended loss of legitimacy due to policy experiments that 
undermine the reigning paradigm, incumbent government can avoid loss of legitimacy by packaging 
the new paradigm within the old paradigm that has been supporting it. In the renovation policy, 
Vietnam packaged the market economy paradigm within the central planning paradigm by projecting 
the goal of “socialist-oriented market economy” and implementing planned policy experiments. In the 
anti-corruption policy, Vietnam seems to package the new anti-corruption paradigm (clean 
government is without corruption) within the old paradigm (government clean by ideological 
default) by attaching the driving force behind anti-corruption policy to the Communist Party. Major 
anti-corruption related activities are under the supervision of the Party. Under the Revised Anti-
corruption Law (November 2012), the Secretary General of the Communist Party heads the Anti-
corruption Steering Committee (while that post was previously held by the Prime Minister).120 
As regards the third assumption on the new paradigm not yet being full-fledged by the time it is 
backed up by political will, incumbent government can eliminate this assumption by capitalizing on the 
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late-comer advantage and applying policy learning from the academia and international experience. In 
the renovation policy, Vietnam can retain a large part of state ownership, instead of rapidly giving 
away state assets in privatization like the cases of the former Soviet Union countries and Eastern 
European countries, and gradually build up the private sector without political disruption thanks to 
applying the lessons from international experience without having to experiment them first hand and 
risking failures. In the anti-corruption policy, it seems that the government expects to follow the 
pattern of planning the steps in anti-corruption efforts, as reflected in the National Anti-corruption 
Strategy by 2010 stipulated in Resolution No.21/NQ-CP. 
The possibility of the anti-corruption paradigm shift to follow the pattern of the renovation paradigm 
shift as mentioned above shows that although the adoption of the Anti-corruption Law seems to be a 
promising milestone marking forthcoming reform, a quick change is not likely to occur as the paradigm 
shift pattern in Vietnam involves a large amount of filtering for policy experiments that are within the 
range of authority of the incumbent and legitimacy of the old reigning paradigm. It is expected that 
only anti-corruption measures that can be controlled by the government and the Party will have a 
chance to be included in the plan. As the ownership of the reform initiative has already been claimed 
by the government and the implementers are expected to be the government itself, there is little 
space left for other actors in the policy community (such as businesses, civil society, epistemic 
community) to play a role in anti-corruption efforts. Therefore, although there have been changes in 
the paradigm on government’s integrity, there is still discrepancies between Vietnam’s current anti-
corruption policy and the formula developed based on Western institutional settings.  











Table 25: Paradigm Shift Patterns in Anti-corruption Policy 
No anti-corruption policy Anti-corruption policy and 
political contestation (theory) 
Anti-corruption policy without 
political contestation (Vietnam) 
The government is by 
ideological default clean 
The government is clean only if 
corruption is eliminated and 
prevented 
The government is clean only if 
corruption is eliminated and 
prevented 
The integrity of the government 
is institutional and 
unquestionable 
The integrity of the government 
is put through contestation 
under checks and balances by 
actors in policy community 
beyond government 
The integrity of the government 
is preserved by its proactive 
anti-corruption efforts which 
avoid political contestation 
Government can keep itself 
clean on its own 
Participation of actors in policy 
community beyond government 
is needed in anti-corruption 
efforts 
Participation of actors in anti-
corruption policy community is 
planned and guided by the 
government 
 
4.2.4. Anti-corruption Paradigm Shift Games 
The need to participate in international integration is the key driver of change in the case of Vietnam’s 
economic renovation policy in the mid-1980s. International integration also has a great impact on anti-
corruption policy, as explored in the Appendix: Impact of International Integration on Anti-corruption 
Policy Making. The "Proactive Paradigm Shift" game models then can be applied in Vietnam’s 
proactive paradigm shift in corruption control, which is a rational choice of strategy for the 
government to avoid challenges to its authority.  
This proactive anti-corruption paradigm shift is constructed upon the assumptions of Vietnam’s own 
settings that the incumbent authority has the power to change the rule of the game to preserve its 
authority, actors might not have equal footing in advocating their viewpoints, and institutional settings 
with high institutional stability can have changes without disintegrating the old paradigm and re-
institutionalizing the new paradigm, without the competition process among political actors.  
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The first assumption is that the party/government can choose the “new” ideas that can help solve 
problems but keep the position of the current system entrenched, thus having idea filtering for an 
anti-corruption plan that will lead to policy change upon implementation. 
The second assumption is that the role of policy learning can replace the role of contestation. The 
paradigm shift proclaimed by the government is not solely driven by the government; many other 
actors join the policy arena. However, their participation in the policy process is kept from forming an 
opposing force threatening the existence of the government, and their policy advice inputs are to be 
incorporated in incremental changes via experiments.  
The third assumption is that the high level of institutional stability allows the regime to absorb 
external shocks and change its ideational framework step by step to preserve its legitimacy in each 
policy choice. The prolonged process in turn allows the policy regime to benefit from international 
policy learning as a form of late comer advantage. 
Whether or not these assumptions are again challenged needs further research and confirmation by 
results of the implementation of anti-corruption policy. If these assumptions still hold, there might be 
some possibility for an actual anti-corruption paradigm shift to occur in the long run, in the way 
incremental policy experimentation seemed to have accumulated to a paradigm shift that had been 
proclaimed by the government more than two decades ago when they proactively began the 
renovation policy. Although the pace of change in the market economy paradigm shift was slow and 
the result (Vietnam as a market economy, not a centrally planned economy) is not worldwide 
recognized, using elements of the market economy paradigm via policy learning within the central 
planning paradigm did help Vietnam go to the market economy in a centrally planned way.  
The market economy paradigm shift has one “slowing down” factor making the short way long 
(removing the fourth and the fifth stages but prolonging the pace of change): There seems to be a 
“proactive paradox” when the government tries to filter for elements of the new paradigm (market 
economy) within the framework of the old paradigm (centrally planning all collective actions) and has 
a planned transition to a socialist-oriented market economy. However, in the case of anti-corruption 
policy, there is a double paradox. Besides the “proactive paradox” (attempts to shift to the new anti-
corruption paradigm within the framework of the old paradigm – clean government by supervision of 
the ideological driver – the Party), there is, in Fritzen (2006)121’s terms, “the orthodox paradox of anti-
corruption work” as the essence of anti-corruption work is that the very actors which must adopt and 
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implement policies to curb corruption are those which may face weak, or even negative, incentives to 
do so.122 Given this double paradox of anti-corruption policy in Vietnam’s pattern of paradigm shift, it 
is difficult to predict the pace at which anti-corruption policy can bring about policy change. There is 
still some possibility, though, that one day Vietnam will get a kind of self-checked anti-corruption 
government, just like it has a socialist-oriented market economy now after more than two decades of 
great efforts. 
Despite the claim of a big milestone in anti-corruption policy in Vietnam when the Anti-Corruption Law 
was adopted, there has not been much change in anti-corruption results, which is confirmed by both 
factual indication and theoretical discussion. Although the Anti-corruption Law is comprehensive and 
includes major strategies necessary for combating and preventing corruption, there are not sufficient 
incentives for implementers to carry out what has been stipulated, leading to almost unchanged level 
of corruption in Vietnam, which is already alarmingly high.  
There seem to be no problem with the design of the Law or the technical details of regulations that 
follows, but the slowing factor lies in the “proactive paradox” of Vietnam’s design of paradigm shift, 
which adds to the complication of the anti-corruption issue. Following the pattern of the proactive 
paradigm shift to a socialist-oriented market economy, the proactive anti-corruption paradigm shift 
might lead to significant policy change if the policy experiments that can get through the filtering (in 
the form of policy learning) can lead to the formation of anti-corruption actors in the way market 
elements such as private businesses and foreign owned enterprises were formed with economic policy 
experiments in the 1990s. However, the anti-corruption paradigm shift is even harder to instill change 
as compared to the market economy paradigm shift. Instead of having the integrity of the government 
put through contestation under checks and balances by actors in policy community beyond 
government, the current anti-corruption approach is designed to preserve the integrity of the 
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government by its proactive anti-corruption efforts which avoid political contestation as participation 
of actors in anti-corruption policy community is planned and guided by the government. Therefore, it 
is difficult to predict when Vietnam will achieve the goal of having a self-checked anti-corruption 
government, just like it was difficult to envisage more than twenty years ago that Vietnam will have a 
socialist-oriented market economy. 
All in all, the complication of anti-corruption paradigm shift corresponds to the "Proactive Paradigm 
Shift" games as predicted. For the macro level "Paradigm Choice" game, the proactive paradigm shift is 
the rational choice. 
 
Table 26: Nash Equilibrium of the “Paradigm Choice” Game 
Player A                            Player B Old paradigm New paradigm 
Old paradigm 0,0 0,1 
New paradigm 1,0 2,1 
 
The double paradox is reflected in the repeated "Formulator – Implementer Interactions" game in the 
table below.  
 
Table 27: Double Paradox of Corruption Control as the “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” 
Game 
                                 Implementer 
Formulator 
implement formulated policy not implement formulated 
policy 
mainstream new paradigm into 
formulated policy 
effective policy towards new 
paradigm direction 
incremental change towards 
new paradigm direction 
not mainstream new paradigm 
into formulated policy 
outcome driven by 
implementer's agenda, not 
towards new paradigm 




As for the "orthodox paradox of anti-corruption work" (the actors that must adopt and implement 
anti-corruption policies are those which may face weak, or even negative, incentives to do so), the 
weak incentives of the implementers of anti-corruption policy are tied to the weak incentives to 
adopt the policy by the formulators in the first place. That is, the probability that Player D chooses 
strategy d1 is the same as the probability that Player C chooses strategy c2.  
 
Table 28: Orthodox Paradox as Corresponding Probabilities 
Player C                            Player D strategy d1 [probability (1-p)] strategy d2 [probability p] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,1 
strategy c2 [probability (1-p) 1,1  0,0 
 
The “Proactive Paradigm Shift” games of “Paradigm Choice” and “Formulator – Implementer 
Interactions” fit and can explain not only the paradigm shift in economic renovation policy but also in 
corruption control policy in Vietnam. The corresponding probabilities (q = 1 – p) [when the weak 
incentives of the implementers of anti-corruption policy are tied to the weak incentives to adopt the 
policy by the formulators] lead to the same mixed strategy solution as in the 2nd game developed from 
the privatization case. The solution of the game will also be the solution to the maximization problem: 
the closer p is to 1 (the more the new paradigm is actually mainstreamed/incorporated into policy), 
the higher the payoffs to all players. 
Section 4.3 will show that the probability that Player C chooses strategy c2 also exists in the corruption 
control game (the case when the new corruption control paradigm is not mainstreamed into the policy 
making process at the micro level), as shown in the lack of corruption control measures in healthcare 
socialization policy in Vietnam in the recent decade. 
 
4.3. 2nd Game 4th Quarter: Lack of Corruption Control in Healthcare Socialization in Vietnam 
The case of corruption control in healthcare socialization has been chosen because it reflects the 
overall corruption control in a transitional Vietnam towards the market economy. This case also 
offers parallel points to consider as compared to the case of corruption in SOE equitization in the 
previous section on building the "Proactive Paradigm Shift" games to capture the pattern of paradigm 
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shift in Vietnam, as socialization is also a Vietnamese customized word for partial privatization in 
healthcare, education, sports and cultural activities. 
The focus of this part is on the mainstreaming of the new anti-corruption paradigm into the policy 
making process. In this case, mainstreaming corruption control into policy making is to have 
preventive measures, which is different from curative measures when corruption is at a high level and 
efforts can only be expected to focus on sectors vulnerable to corruption and cause much public 
discontent.  Thus, to evaluate whether corruption control has been mainstreamed into the policy 
making, this section focuses on the analysis of the legal documents regulating different aspects of the 
healthcare socialization process. 
“Socialize” is a translated word from Vietnamese “xa hoi hoa”, literally meaning “involving the 
society”, or social mobilization (xa hoi = society, hoa = turn into, become). The policy of social 
mobilization in health was pursued in the mid-2000s to mobilize resources in society for promoting 
health care and protection.  This is a process of opening up various sectors to multiple sources of 
investment with a view to extending service supply resources, diversifying types of healthcare services, 
and creating pressure to increase service quality. In essence it is a form of healthcare privatization. 
The process of healthcare socialization has its roots in the government’s introduction of a set of 
neoliberal health policy measures in the late 1980s – the same period of economic reform that ignited 
the SOE privatization process. The government began to reform the financing and delivery of 
healthcare by, among others, (1) allowing greater cost recovery through the introduction of user 
charges at the three higher levels of the health care system (the district health centers, provincial 
hospitals, and national hospitals), (2) legalizing the private provision of health services, and (3) 
liberalizing the pharmaceutical industry.123 
Vietnam’s reform in healthcare was not unique. In the 1980s most part of the world witnessed a 
neoliberal economic agenda – a move toward privatization, competition, and the introduction of 
“market mechanism” into medical care.124 However, it should be noted that the level of success of 
these market experiments was not clear. By the mid-1990s some countries had scaled down the more 
drastic market reforms and shifted to a more gradualist approach to market reforms.125 
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Healthcare socialization is a relatively new policy in Vietnam. There have been some growth in the 
number of private hospitals and some units within public hospitals have been “commercialized” to 
increase user charge for the services provided (partial privatization of public hospitals). However, 
private hospitals now only contribute less than 5% of total hospital beds (as compared to the target of 
20% of hospital beds by 2020).  There have been several concerns in the healthcare socialization 
process, such as equity and quality, and risks of new forms of corrupt behaviors are among the 
problems in the process. 
If the anti-corruption measures are well incorporated into the healthcare socialization policies, then 
during the process of privatization, there is expected to be regulation to protect patients from 
financial abuse by medical providers in both public and private health facilities, pharmacies, and drug 
vendors. 
If the anti-corruption measures are not well incorporated into the healthcare socialization policies, 
then during and even after the process of privatization, there is expected to be little or no regulation 
to protect patients from financial abuse by medical providers in both public and private health 
facilities, pharmacies, and drug vendors. 
In the legal documents regulating healthcare socialization, lack of corruption control has been found in 
several aspects. 
(1) Conflict of interests are allowed when the medical professionals are encouraged to invest in the 
socialized facilities that they have the authority to assign the patients to use related service and pay 
for it so that they can receive higher legal incomes. 
Circular No.135/2008/TT-BTC dated December 31, 2008 of the Ministry of Finance guiding the 
Government's Decree No.69/2008/ND-CP dated May 30, 2008, on incentive policies for the 
socialization of educational, vocational training, health care, cultural, sports and environmental 
activities stipulates that  
"Establishments may raise capital in the form of share, capital contributions from employees 
and other lawful channels through cooperation and association with enterprises, economic 
and financial institutions, and domestic and overseas individuals for building material 
foundations. 
Dividend payments and profits divided among shareholders or parties to joint ventures or 




When the employees of the socialized healthcare units – the providers of service – are encouraged to 
contribute capital to the units, they have incentives to directly link their actions as providers to their 
profits. This situation gives rise to the principal-agent problem in health care as providers become 
imperfect agents of patients and have incentives to act to maximize their profits at the expense of the 
patients’ interests.  
(2) There are no regulations to prevent frauds of insurance claims when under new regulations of 
hospital autonomy, the staff benefit from the funds of income from various sources including 
insurance claims. 
Under the national health insurance scheme introduced in 1993, government employees and 
employees of state or private enterprises are insured for the cost of inpatient and outpatient 
treatment in state health facilities. All official service and medicine fees (except some categories of 
health issues and non-fee costs) are covered.126 
The case of health insurance fraud in Cho Ray hospital in Ho Chi Minh city confirms that the lack of 
fraud prevention in health insurance claim can give wrong doers the chance to take money from the 
insurance fund. Luu To Lan, aged 43, doctor at Cho Ray Hospital, formed a "team" with other doctors, 
pharmacists, nurses and technicians to get compensation from the state insurance fund for fake cases 
of "treatment" at the hospital. They faked 1168 prescriptions and got VND 3.9 billion from the 
insurance from January to April 2009. They have been convicted of "abusing position and/or power to 
appropriate property"  according to Article 280 of Vietnam's Criminal Code on 27 April 2012 at Ho Chi 
Minh City People's Court.127 
(3) When the regulations are revised, the corruption control measures that were included in the 
previous ones were removed in the revised, more update regulations. 
In the Resolution No.62/NQ-CP on simplification of administrative procedures under Ministry of Health 
Care dated 17 December 2010, the requirements for price listing of many categories of imported 
medicines, which had been in place in previous legal documents, were removed. It should be noted 
that in Vietnam, it is prevalent that doctors received commissions from pharmaceutical companies in 
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exchange for prescribing their patients with medicine provided by those firms (up to 25% in some 
cases128). When the prices of medicines are unregulated, patients are likely to get unnecessary 
prescriptions or those at a high price or both. Even in cases that pharmaceutical companies have to 
register retail prices in line with state regulations on medicine prices, pharmaceutical sales 
representatives have found ways to circumvent the measures129. 
This removal of corruption control in healthcare is a signal of the lack of corruption control paradigm 
mainstreaming at the larger scale. It is not surprising that the 2011 Revised Anti-corruption Law itself 
also has several corruption control measures removed from the 2005 Law. For example, the asset 
disclosure requirements have been scaled down. 
The lack of corruption control in healthcare socialization also reflects the “proactive paradox”. 
Although the problems of corruption in SOE equitization has received much attention and corruption 
control in SOE equitization has been mainstreamed into the Anti-corruption Law and its revision, 
corruption control in privatization in general has not been “proactively” incorporated. There seems 
to be no “spill-over” effect from the attention to SOE equitization corruption problems onto the 
healthcare socialization problems. As healthcare socialization began nearly two decades after SOE 
equitization, it might take some more time before the problem of corruption and lack of corruption 
control in healthcare socialization becomes an item highly prioritized in the policy agenda. 
The lack of corruption control in healthcare socialization show that the corruption control paradigm is 
not mainstreamed into policy making. Player C does play the game with strategy c2 in some cases at a 
(1-p) probability that is not 0, because p is less than 1. The basis of the rules of the 2nd game of 
“Interactions” holds: Once the new paradigm has been claimed to be reached before there is authority 
fragmentation and contestation, the policy formulators do not face the pressure to incorporate the 
new paradigm into policies. 
With the existence of the possibility of c2 being chosen by Player C, as can be seen in the lack of 
mainstreaming of corruption control into healthcare socialization, the anti-corruption paradigm shift 
“Interactions” game also tends to follow the model of the game developed in the previous sections 
(Table 28). 
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Player C                            Player D strategy d1 [probability (1-p)] strategy d2 [probability p] 
strategy c1 [probability p] 1,1 1,1 
strategy c2 [probability (1-p) 1,1  0,0 
 
The Nash equilibrium to the game is found in mixed strategy, not in pure strategy, and the outcome 
maximization problem leads to the same solution:  
Total average payoff = p*1*(1-p)*1 + (1-p)*1*(1-p)*1 + p*1*p*1 + (1-p)*0*p*0 
                                      = p*(1-p) + (1-p)2 + p2  
                                      = 1 + (1-p)2 




In this thesis, the reason why Vietnam is ineffective in its corruption control in privatization has been 
explored in the bigger context of the issue: Vietnam’s paradigm shift in renovation policy and 
corruption control. The issue of corruption in privatization and lack of corruption control in 
privatization are explored as part of the overall conceptual framework that has been developed to 
explain Vietnam’s paradigm shift, which is different from Hall’s model which could explain paradigm 
shift in other contexts. 
The game theoretic explanation is based on the similarities and differences between the paradigm 
shift pattern predicted by Peter Hall’s model and Vietnam’s paradigm shift pattern. While paradigm 
shift in other contexts (in the UK’s shift from Keynesianism to monetarism and in Hungary’s shift from 
central planning to the market economy via privatization) follow the pattern in Hall’s Paradigm Shift 
model to go through 6 stages of (1) Paradigm Stability, (2) Anomaly, (3) Policy Experimentation, (4) 
Authority Fragmentation, (5) Contestation, and (6) Paradigm Institutionalization, Vietnam’s paradigm 
shift is a “short-cut” that omits the 4th and 5th stages.  
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The choice to avoid the authority fragmentation and contestation can be explained in the “Paradigm 
Choice” game as the dominant pure strategy of Player A – the government – in a one-off game in 
which Player A has the advantage if he can have the first move (first-mover advantage) and can ensure 
his victory over Player B – the opposition – by choosing the strategy that leads to the best final payoff 
– claiming to have proactively shifted to the new paradigm. 
However, although the authority fragmentation and contestation can be avoided in the "proactive 
paradigm shift" game at the macro ideological level, it is inevitable at the micro policy-making level in 
the repeated game between Player C – policy formulator – and Player D – policy implementer 
(repeated “Formulator – Implementer Interactions" game). Unlike the macro proactive paradigm shift 
game, this game has no pure strategy but can be solved with a mixed strategy, resulting in a 
combination of two different outcomes, depending on the choice of strategies by the players (for the 
policy formulator, the two strategies to choose are (1) to mainstream the new paradigm (which has 
been adopted in the "proactive paradigm shift" manner) into policy and (2) not to mainstream the new 
paradigm into policy; for the policy implementer: (1) to implement the formulated policy and (2) not to 
implement the formulated policy). 
The games developed in this thesis have explained that Vietnam’s proactive paradigm shift towards a 
“socialist-oriented market economy” and in corruption control (to avoid authority fragmentation and 
contestation) is not an anomaly to Hall’s model but a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the “Paradigm 
Choice” game given the payoffs in Vietnam’s settings. The stages that Vietnam’s government avoided 
with Play A’s first-mover advantage – authority fragmentation and contestation – are reflected in the 
repeated game of “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” game, which is solved based on the 
probabilities of players choosing their strategies (mixed strategy solution) as it has no pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium. 
The “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” game provides a conceptual framework to understand 
the existence of corruption in SOE equitization in Vietnam in its “proactive paradigm shift” towards the 
market economy: This is the 4th quarter of the payoff matrix of the game, the case of Player C’s 
choosing strategy c2 at the probability of (1 – p) and Player D’s choosing strategy d1 at the probability 
of p; the probability of the two players are corresponding i.e. q = 1 – p, because Player D has second-
mover advantage and can choose the strategy based on the observation of what strategy Player C has 
already chosen).  
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The two games of “Paradigm Choice” and “Formulator – Implementer Interactions” are also applicable 
to the paradigm shift in corruption control with its “double paradoxes” of “proactive paradox” and 
“orthodox paradox”. One of the applicability requirements is tested in the case of the lack of 
corruption control paradigm mainstreaming in healthcare socialization. The 4th quarter of the 2nd game 
showed that Player C does play the game with strategy c2 in some cases at a (1-p) probability that is 
not 0, because p is less than 1. The closer to 1 that p is, the smaller the probability of the problem of 
lack of corruption control in privatization in the corruption control paradigm shift games. Likewise, the 
closer to 1 that p is, the smaller the probability of the problem of corruption in privatization in the pro-
market paradigm shift games. 
The two games help to explain why Vietnam’s corruption control in privatization is ineffective by 
providing the conceptual framework for the context of the problem of corruption in privatization – the 
broader context of the special paradigm shift pattern in Vietnam in its economic renovation and 
corruption control. The problem of corruption in privatization (as in the case of SOE equitization) and 
lack of corruption control in privatization (as in the case of healthcare socialization) are linked to the 
deviation of Vietnam’s 4-stage Proactive Paradigm Shift from Hall’s 6-stage Paradigm Shift model to 
avoid authority fragmentation and contestation. If the payoffs to the players involved in the games are 
kept at the current value, then slow gradual change is expected in Vietnam’s fight against corruption, 
similar to its long march towards a socialist-oriented market economy. The result of low 
institutionalization of anti-corruption is predicted by the model, just as the uniqueness of Vietnam’s 
“socialist-oriented market economy”. 
This thesis shows that theories of public policy and game theory method are useful tools to 
understand many public policy issues in many contexts, including a developing and transitional country 
like Vietnam. It also contributes game theoretic models to explain policy problems in Vietnam and 
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Impact of International Integration on Anti-corruption Policy Making  




International integration, the process in which a country integrates into the world economy, influences 
public policy making at the national level through a number of channels. As economies are more and 
more interdependent, policy issues become more and more related and the perception of issues has 
changed. On the one hand, policy makers have new opportunities for policy learning. On the other 
hand, many other actors in the policy community also have the chances of exposure to new patterns 
of participation in policy-making that come with the international integration process. 
Anti-corruption policy making, especially in developing and transitional countries, is also affected by 
the international integration process through these channels. Among the various sources of influences 
of the international integration process, global civil society plays an increasingly important part. The 
impact of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) reflects the ideational impact of the 
international integration process in the way policy ideas and perception of issues are circulated 
through these organizations. A case study on an INGO – Transparency International – would highlight 
the influence of international integration on anti-corruption policy making process and provide 
significant empirical evidence to test the generalizability of theoretical framework on the trends of 
influences of international integration on public policy making. 
The overall goal of this appendix is to look into the possible impact of the process in which a country 
integrates into the world economy on its anti-corruption policy making. Theoretically, the link between 
international integration and policy making will be investigated through a synthesis of researches on 
the mechanisms through which domestic policy processes are linked to the international integration 
process and its impacts. Empirically, ideational influences of INGOs on how states address corruption 






The characteristics of the international integration process might not be fully captured if the analysis 
further narrows down the impact of international integration to the impact of global civil society, as it 
is only one of the structures that cut across national boundaries and pose challenges to the authority 
and autonomy of the state in its policy making. Therefore, in this appendix, the impact of INGOs is 
used as a proxy to represent the impact of international integration. To fully capture the impact of 
international integration, a synthesis of the impact of all the international actors and processes is 
required, which is beyond the scope of this appendix. For the purpose of balancing the theoretical 
findings and empirical testing of the framework, the empirical case focuses on only one of the INGO – 
Transparency International. 
In this appendix, international integration is referred to as part of the bigger trend of 
internationalization or globalization which involves all countries in the world – the process in which 
states have increasing inter-links but still retain the fundamentals of the state system. The term 
international integration is used for relevance for the context of transitional and developing countries, 
but the terms “globalization” and “internationalization” will also be used interchangeably.  
1. Three Sources of Impact of International Integration on National Policy Making 
Issue-perception-driven change: ideational pressure  
As countries are more and more exposed to international forces, policy issues no longer exist as 
isolated ones involving discrete sectors. For example, telecommunications, information technology 
and computing have been merged by a digital revolution.130 E-commerce has become the overlapping 
issue of information technology and trade. This changing nature of trade in turn gives rise to new 
concerns such as intellectual property and anti-trust regulations for e-commerce.131 Likewise, 
international trade issues lead to changes in the approach to various policies. Agricultural subsidy is 
not only a policy issue within the agricultural area but also is linked to rural development and 
environmental policies. International efforts to reduce this kind of subsidy also influence social welfare 
in particular and government fiscal policy in general.132 In this way, policy making in one issue area is 
                                                          
130
 Carr, Nicholas (2009), The Big Switch: Rewiring the World, from Edison to Google, W.W. Norton & Co. 
131
 Foer, Albert A. (2001), “E-Commerce Meets Antitrust: A Primer”, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, Vol.20, No.1 – 
Spring  2001 (Competition Policy and Antitrust Law), pp. 51-63 
132
 Unger, Brigitte and Waarden, Frans Van, (eds) (1995), Convergence or Diversity? Internationalization and Economic Policy 
Response, Aldershot: Avebury 
101 
 
inevitably linked to the process in which numerous other policy issues are considered due to the 
influence of this international integration process. 
Similar to the previous era of globalization in the late nineteenth century133, today’s international 
integration, with such strong driving forces as the digital revolution and trade interconnectedness, has 
led to the changes in some policy issues. More importantly, such changes in the characteristics of the 
policy issues in turn lead to the changes in the way policy issues are perceived. The way in which 
national policies are made is increasingly seen in a close link to the globalization process. According to 
Drezner, “the question of national policy autonomy has triggered the most public anxiety about 
globalization. Polling data reveal that U.S. citizens believe that the integration of the United States 
with the rest of the world has greatly constrained U.S. policy autonomy, creating ambivalence about 
further international integration. This anxiety is even greater in other countries since they are far more 
dependent on the global economy than the United States.”134 According to Sandholtz and Gray (2003), 
“societies that are open to the rest of the world import not just goods and capital, but also ideas, 
information, and norms.” International transactions can therefore promote major policy shifts and 
reshape the domestic economies and the politics of countries.135 
In general, the globalization process could affect the way states make their policies. Several theories 
have been developed to explain the incorporation of the changes induced by international integration 
into national policy making. Some evolve around the possibility of ideational impact of international 
integration on policy making. For example, Drezner reviews various theoretical explanations of how 
globalization could affect the ability of states to regulate their own economies. Campbell136 discusses 
the possible impact of globalization on existing national institutions (with a focus on fiscal and 
economic policies) to illustrate his theoretical claims about institutional change – that ideas are 
probably as crucial as self interests in explaining patterns of institutional change. However, according 
to Howlett, Ramesh and Perl (2009), studies on the international system’s influence on domestic public 
policy are still at an early stage.137  
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In short, international integration has led to the overlapping of sectors and issues, thus expanding the 
possibility of policy change due to changes in perception of policy issues. Ideational pressure as a 
source of impact of globalization on national policy making – policy change that is driven by the 
changes in perception of policy issues – therefore offers an interesting explanation of the impact of 
international integration on national policy making that need to be further tested against empirical 
evidence. 
Policy-maker-driven change: policy learning  
According to Howlett and Ramesh (2006), globalization increases the opportunities for cross-sectoral 
and cross-national interaction among policy practitioners and commentators.138 Policy makers have 
more opportunities to filter and adopt ideas that have been generated in other countries. In this way, 
the ideational pressure materializes its impact as a late-comer advantage to policy makers in 
developing and transitional countries. There is a possibility that, as pointed out by Drezner (2001), 
“states alter institutions and regulations because a set of beliefs has developed sufficient normative 
power that leaders fear looking like laggards if they do not adopt similar policies.”139 Policy lessons 
from other countries can be seen as a transferrable “know-how” brought along by knowledge-based 
communities, international organizations, and policy entrepreneurs.140 The international integration 
process thus makes policy learning available at the disposal of policy makers worldwide. 
Policy makers can be the bridges between international integration and policy making by their choice 
of policies based on international experience learning and other kinds of policy learning. According to 
Howlett and Ramesh (2006) 141, the source of many of the changes in the patterns of policy tool choice 
lies in the domestic rather than the international arena. To the extent that global factors have had an 
effect, it is through indirect and opportunity effects rather than direct ones. Policy makers’ choice of 
policy tools based on their learning from foreign counterparts or other sources is therefore an 
important driving force of changes in the way policies are made domestically. In this way, globalization 
has indirect effects on policy making via the policy learning by policy makers. 
Policy makers also use international integration as a means to drive their agenda through the 
perception of issues. As international integration opens up opportunities for domestic actors to 
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promote their agendas and policy instrument preferences, policy entrepreneurs in policy making can 
capitalize on globalization to introduce their preferred positions into governments’ formal policy 
agenda for adoption.142 They can refer to international developments to advance their preferred 
position. For example, the Asian financial crisis provided an opportunity for policy makers in many 
countries to consider enhanced supervision of financial institutions.143 Policy makers can also “use the 
rhetoric of globalization to justify actions based on “foreign” actions and ideas.”144 In this way, policy 
makers do not merely respond to the ideational pressure of globalization by learning, they also actively 
use the perception of issue connectedness (the perception that issues have changed and merged due 
to international integration) to support their choice of policy making. 
In short, international integration has facilitated policy learning and enabled the incorporation of 
international policy experiences into domestic policy making by policy makers. The ideational impact of 
international integration via policy learning by policy makers can explain many policy changes in 
various sectors, but this channel of impact needs to be tested against empirical evidence. 
Policy-community-driven change: policy making participation  
International integration gives the opportunity for various domestic groups to participate in policy 
making and seek new patterns of pushing for their interests, values, agenda, etc. in the policy making 
process. International integration also gives new actors (such as international organizations and 
regimes) opportunities to gain access to policy deliberations and affect policy outcomes in ways that 
suit their interests. That is, the ideational pressure of globalization can be via policy making 
participation by various actors that might not have the authority to make policies but still have a 
certain level of impact on policy making in the capacity of policy community participants. 
The perception that policy issues become more intertwined with international integration encourages 
many domestic actors to be involved in the policy making process to represent their interests and 
values. For example, as Howlett and Ramesh (2006: 184) notes, “actors with an interest (for material 
or ideological reasons) in a reduced state role in the economy can cite the imperatives of globalization, 
and the norms of market efficiency innate to it, to demand reduction in the use of command and 
control instruments… Civil society groups concerned about the environment, human rights, and equity 
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are also able to align themselves with like-minded groups in other countries to seek stronger 
regulation of the adverse aspects of market processes.”145 
The presence of new actors/more active participation of actors in policy making with new 
ideas/changed perceptions due to globalization is an important part in a country’s policy change. 
According to Howlett and Ramesh (2002:41), “internationalization… serves to introduce new actors 
and new ideas into domestic policy making processes and undermines existing closed networks and 
path dependencies at the domestic level. This situation explains the well-recognized propensity of 
internationalization to lead to significant policy changes in many sectors and areas of social and 
political life.” Overall, internationalization promotes the restructuring of policy subsystems in such a 
way as to form hospitable circumstances for swifter and deeper policy changes than would otherwise 
be the case.146  
According to Coleman and Perl (1999)147, in the context of internationalized policy making, there is a 
possibility for the emergence of policy community mediators from actors with joint membership in 
policy communities. These idea entrepreneurs can drive policy change by providing idea inputs to 
different actors in the policy community who participate in the policy making process. Thus another 
source of impact of international integration on policy making is through the participation in policy 
making of different actors within policy community. This policy-community-driven change via policy 
making participation, however, is theoretically probable only and needs to be empirically tested. 
In short, there are three hypotheses of the impact of international integration on anti-corruption 
policy making. 
(1) International integration leads to the merges and interactions of issues, which in turn change 
the way issues are perceived; this international dimension in the ideational pressure is a possible input 
to policy making via two possible channels as follows 
(2) International integration affects policy making via policy learning by policy makers 
(3) International integration affects policy making via policy making participation by actors in the 
policy community (that are not the authoritative policy makers) 
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These hypothesis needs to be empirically tested. First, the force of international integration needs to 
be represented by a specific form. Second, a specific policy issue is to be considered. Therefore, careful 
choice of empirical material would be necessary.  
In this appendix, INGOs are selected to test the first part of the first hypothesis: the changes in policy 
issues induced by international integration lead to ideational pressure for policy change. The 
mechanisms in which such ideational pressure impacts national policy making are then shown in the 
ideational impact of an INGO – Transparency International – on the policy making of a public issue – 
anti-corruption policy making. Three sources of policy change will be tested: (1) issue-perception-
driven change, (2) policy-maker-driven change, and (3) policy-community-driven change. 
 
2. Empirical Material: INGOs, Anti-corruption Policy and Transparency International 
International Nongovernmental Organizations 
The rise of INGOs and their role in the process of international integration are the confirmation of the 
first part of the first hypothesis: International integration leads to the merges and interactions of 
issues, which in turn change the way issues are perceived; the changing nature and characteristics of 
issues due to international integration give rise to the international dimension of ideational pressure in 
the form of INGOs. 
In general, global civil society is an emerging parallel arrangement of political interaction besides the 
states. According to Lipschutz (2006), it is focused on “the self-conscious construction of networks of 
knowledge and action, by decentred, local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of space as though 
they were not there.”148 Civil society consists not only of NGOs but also other types of associations, 
NGO is a subset of civil society, and INGOs are NGOs with members in more than one country. It 
should be noted that INGOs do not operate solely within the sphere of civil society, but in the 
interactions with state actors, the general public, corporations, or international organizations as they 
persuade these actors to alter their policies or behavior. 149 
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INGOs have had considerable growth in the last two decades. Of about 37000 INGOs today, nearly one 
sixth was formed in the 1990s.150 The activities of INGOs cover many issues such as economic 
development, infrastructure, environment, politics, education, religion, health, culture and recreation, 
law/policy advocacy, social services, and research.151  
According to Christensen (2006), INGO impacts are in terms of input strategies, pursuits, output 
forums, and constitutional/national competition, representing various points and means of INGO 
influence on international, national, and local policy. In the “input strategy” impact factor, INGOs have 
three types of strategies: isolation (influence policy by staying away from the state and develop 
alternative approaches as independent-sector networks), advocacy (communicate with governments 
about policy through various techniques), and cooperation. In the “pursuit” impact factor, INGOs 
impacts materialize in their primary activities, such as policy creation and modification, monitoring, 
enforcement and implementation (policy/institutional influence), service provision and capacity-
building. In the “output forums” factor – at local, national and international levels, INGOs influence 
public policy by various ways, such as introducing certain ideas to a populace, facilitating a minority 
voice, or changing a political atmosphere. The “constitutional/national competition” impact factor of 
INGOs is shown in the overlapping of many rules and other legal structures already defined in local or 
national policy, as, for example, in the cases of the movements leading to the formation of the land 
mine treaty and the drafting of the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court. 
Under this impact factor, national and local policies are influenced by international laws seeded by 
INGOs. 
If being considered within the framework of the policy process, the four impact factors of INGOs – 
inputs strategies, pursuits, output forums, and constitutional/national competition – spread in all the 
stages of the policy making cycle – from involvement in agenda setting and policy formulation to 
advocacy for policy adoption, participation and voice in policy implementation and evaluation. In 
terms of policy issues, on the one hand, a number of INGOs focus on certain policy issues within their 
own goals; on the other hand, many INGOs promote a broad range of issues.152  INGOs do participate 
in certain activities such as service provision, policy implementation, etc., but the majority of the 
channels through which INGOs have impact on national policy making are in terms of ideational 
impact: advocacy via communication with governments about policy (through various techniques such 
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as protest, negotiation, friendly and high-pressure lobbying activities, etc.), policy creation and 
modification, monitoring, capacity-building, introducing certain ideas to certain audience, facilitating 
minority voices, etc.  
According to Florini (2006:685), the political effectiveness of civil society groups in general and INGOs 
in particular depend on their ability to persuade others – state actors, the general public, corporations, 
or intergovernmental organizations – to alter their policies or behavior. Thus, an INGO with significant 
ideational impact and recognized persuasion power would make a good case study on the impact of 
international integration on policy making. Such a case study will help to facilitate the observation of 
key variables associated with international integration such as activities aiming at ideational impact, 
persuasion power to different groups involved in the policy making process, etc. 
Also, it should be noted that the policy process takes place within a country’s borders, while the 
activities of INGOs are across borders. Thus the influence of INGOs on national policy making has a 
similar mechanism with the impact of international integration on policy making. INGOs are 
appropriate proxies for the international integration process as on the one hand, they gather the 
forces that bring about the interconnectedness among countries in their approach, and on the other 
hand, they are among the multiple channels and mechanisms whereby international factors produce 
domestic effects.153 The difference in the impact of INGOs and the impact of international integration 
is that international integration is a trend that occurs as economies and activities become increasingly 
interrelated and policy issues become consequently merged and entangled while INGOs are 
organizations with purposeful choice of their goals, focus and/or combination of policy issues to 
pursue and working approaches in the context of a globalized world. 
As INGOs represent the forces of international integration in a proactive manner, it is expected that 
the empirical evidence of the impact of international integration on policy making via the proxy of 
INGOs would be prominent and observable.154 Therefore, a case study on the impact of one INGO on 
policy making in a certain issue is expected to contribute to the understanding of the influence of 
international integration on policy making. 
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Anti-corruption policy making is a good choice to test the hypotheses on the impact of international 
integration on policy making. On the one hand, there are increasing interconnectedness between 
international integration and corruption issue. On the other hand, anti-corruption policy making 
involves various participants – both the policy makers with their institutional authorities and others 
actors within the policy community. Corruption issue not only involves market failures (the typical 
rationale for public policy making) but also government failures (the inherent problems when 
collective actions are done via the government), thus the dynamics of the anti-corruption policy 
making process is complicated and fascinating.  
The relation between international integration and the corruption issue is a challenging, yet promising, 
research agenda. According to Wang and Rosenau (2001), though corruption and anti-corruption 
efforts are not new phenomena, there has recently been a dramatic ascendance of corruption on the 
global agenda. Not only is public awareness of the corruption issue increased, but people also become 
more judgmental of it, viewing it as detrimental and damaging.155 Corruption issue merges various 
issues involving many sectors. As developing and transitional countries integrate into the world 
economy, corruption has increasingly become more conspicuous. Corruption is no longer an issue 
associated with a certain locality or sector, or a taboo that would further estrange countries pursuing 
different ideologies like in the Cold War, or a stereotype to distinguish between developed and 
developing countries. The damaging effects of corruption cut across almost every aspect of the 
economies and people’s lives. All over the world, corruption has become a global issue.  
Sandholtz and Gray (2003) argue that greater degrees of international integration lead to lower levels 
of corruption, based on their theory that international factors affect a country’s level of corruption 
through two principal channels: economic and normative incentives. Their data analysis supports their 
hypothesis that the more a country is tied into international networks of exchange, communication, 
and organization, the lower its level of corruption is likely to be. International integration tends to lead 
to declining corruption, especially through social integration and the transmission of values and norms. 
156 Overall, the linkage between international integration and the issue of national corruption is 
intriguing and research into this aspect promises interesting findings. 
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The corruption issue itself is a challenging research topic. Corruption issue is associated with both 
market failures and government failures – limitations of government’s ability to correct market 
failures. Governments often create publicly funded organizations to deal with market failures, which 
use labor and other factor inputs to produce outputs, like private firms, but need not pass a market 
test to survive. The very nature of public agencies makes it difficult to monitor their activities. For 
example, bureaucratic supply has the inherent problems of agency loss, difficulty valuing output, 
limited competition, ex-ante rules including civil service constraints and bureau failure as market 
failure.157 These sources of inefficiencies, coupled with context-specific situations, give the 
opportunities for corrupt behaviors and corrupt structures. It is in the design of government 
intervention that government failures are likely, thus the government cannot be expected to be the 
sole decision maker in dealing with public policy issues.  
What is more, according to Paul (1997) 158, government monopoly, the discretionary power it enjoys in 
decision-making, and overall lack of accountability are among some of the major factors contributing 
to corruption. Corruption burgeons where unaccountable government with a monopoly over a good or 
service and the discretion to decide how much of such public resources citizens get. Therefore, the 
government alone cannot be expected to make anti-corruption policy that works. Anti-corruption 
policy making needs to involve not only policy makers but also other actors in the policy community 
beyond government, such as business and civil society. Anti-corruption policy making therefore is an 
issue that can reflect the interactions of various actors in the policy making process which is subject to 
international influence and thus is a good choice for empirical material. 
In short, anti-corruption policy making is an appropriate choice of policy issue to test the hypotheses 
on the impact of globalization on national policy making. The issue-perception-driven change of policy 
making due to international integration can be observed in the way the corruption issue is seen in 
connection with other policy issues through the advocacy of an international non-state actor. The 
channels of change – policy-maker-driven change and policy-community-driven change are expected 
to be clearly observable in anti-corruption policy making as this policy issue requires a high level of 
involvement of these actors. 
All in all, a good case study to be selected would need to satisfy the requirement for empirical material 
that combines the selection of INGOs as the proxy for international integration impact and the policy 
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making process concerning anti-corruption issue. Transparency International would be a potential 
source of evidence for that purpose. 
Transparency International 
Transparency International (TI) introduces itself as “the global civil society organization leading the 
fight against corruption”, bringing people together in a powerful worldwide coalition to end the 
devastating impact of corruption on men, women and children around the world, with the mission of 
creating change towards a world free of corruption. Founded in 1993 and originally based in Germany, 
TI has more than 90 regional chapters and field offices worldwide, along with the International 
Secretariat, the Board of Directors, senior advisors and other volunteers.  
The Board of Directors is TI's central governing body, elected at the Annual Membership Meeting by 
accredited national chapters and individual members. National chapters are independent, locally-
established organizations that actively address corruption in their respective countries. They have their 
own national programs beside following and contributing to TI global and regional strategies and 
policies. National chapters work together with the International Secretariat to tackle corruption. The 
International Secretariat coordinates anti-corruption initiatives within geographical regions and assists 
national chapters in enhancing their methodologies, skills, tools and techniques to fight corruption. On 
international issues, the Secretariat organizes anti-corruption conventions and other cross-border 
initiatives. It also implements the international agenda by serving as a knowledge management centre, 
capturing and disseminating best practice and developing new approaches to tackle corruption. TI is 
governed by its Charter. Its ultimate decision-making body is an Annual Membership Meeting, which 
brings together accredited national chapters and individual members, and elects the Board of 
Directors, TI's central governing body. The National Chapter Accreditation and Individual Members 
Appointment Policy regulate the membership procedure. National chapter guidelines assist National 
Chapters in setting up or pursuing their operations. An Advisory Council, consisting of prominent 
individuals of international standing, advises the movement.159  
As an INGO working on corruption issue, TI is an appropriate source of empirical evidence to test the 
hypotheses on the impact of international integration on national anti-corruption policy making. The 
first hypothesis on issue-perception-driven change (that international integration changes the way a 
public policy issue is perceived – as being in interconnection with other policy issues, thus generating 
changes in policy making) will be tested via the proxy of TI’s strategies in bringing about ideational 
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impact on anti-corruption policy making: TI’s strategies in idea seeding reflect the forces of impact of 
international integration on policy making in a proactive manner. The second hypothesis on policy-
maker-driven change (that ideational impact of international integration on policy making materializes 
through the policy learning by policy makers) will be tested by the impact of TI’s activities on policy 
learning by policy makers in anti-corruption policy making. The third hypothesis on policy-community-
driven change (that ideational impact of international integration on policy making is also through the 
participation of beyond-government-actors in policy community) will be tested by the impact of TI’s 
activities on the participation of businesses, civil society, etc. in the anti-corruption policy making 
process. 
3. Case Study Testing: Impact of International Integration on Anti-corruption Policy Making 
Issue-perception-driven change  
TI plays an important role in publicizing the problems of corruption and creating anti-corruption 
movements in many countries. TI follows the strategy of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating 
information to raise public awareness about the damaging impact of corruption on human and 
economic development, especially in low-income countries.160 The way TI presents the issue of 
corruption and pursues corruption-related agenda is a source that is likely to bring about the issue-
perception-driven change in anti-corruption policy making. TI’s strategies in raising global awareness 
of corruption and urging actions to deal with corruption to enable the attainment of other policy goals, 
such as development, reflect the forces of impact of international integration on policy making in a 
proactive manner. 
It should be noted that TI is not the only source of international ideational impact on anti-corruption 
issues. According to Larmour (2006)161, international organizations like the UN or the OECD play a vital 
role in formalizing and transferring anti-corruption related knowledge. TI was set up to provide a non-
governmental counterpart to these organizations for knowledge about corruption, and it has 
generated indices, tools and websites to give authority to its advocacy. Thus, TI’s ideational impact 
needs to be viewed not as the total measurement of, but instead as representative of, the ideational 
impact of the internationalization process. 
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The publication of TI’s annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) since 1995 has been an immense 
success, as the CPI has been widely used in the discussion of various public policy issues. The CPI offers 
a systematic basis on which to compare perceptions of corruption across countries year by year. As 
assessed by Andersson and Heywood (2009)162, “the publication of the CPI each autumn has generated 
widespread media interest across the world and contributed to galvanizing international anti-
corruption initiatives.” TI’s ideas of “international and national integrity systems” cover a wide range 
of public policy issues. Corruption issue has been projected as an issue that merges issues across 
different sectors and across borders.  The way the issue of corruption is presented merges various 
public policy issues. Construction projects, foreign aids, public procurements, etc. have one point in 
common: anti-corruption measures are expected to be internalized into all of these issues. TI’s focus 
on raising awareness of corruption has attracted a large audience and extensive media coverage. As 
described by Galtung (2000), “the extent of press coverage for TI’s agenda has been remarkable from 
the beginning. Hardly a day passes without reference to the organization somewhere in the media.” All 
these visible signs of TI’s publicity seem to point to the possible influence of anti-corruption ideas in the 
link with other public policy issues as inputs to policy making.  
TI’s CPI can be seen as a kind of policy tools, like other measures of corruption, with the role of guiding 
effective policy formation and review.163 This “product” of TI can be seen as the ideational impact of 
interconnectedness of issues packed as an option for relevant actors to adopt in their anti-corruption 
efforts. In this way, the CPI has helped put corruption on the political agenda, creating pressures for 
reforms across countries and influencing the actions of governments, corporations, civil society 
organizations and the mass media.164 The CPI is also the platform for TI to give specific 
recommendations to countries, aiming at enhancing concerted international efforts in the fight against 
corruption.165 TI’s approach puts each country’s anti-corruption issue in comparison and contrast with 
the issue in other countries, prompting consideration of the international factors in national issues. In 
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other words, the way TI tries to have an impact on national anti-corruption policy making reflects the 
issue-perception-driven change of international integration in the form of a policy tool to be adopted by 
relevant actors in the policy making process. 
The reason why there is little likelihood that TI is the direct source of change also lies in the 
complications of the corruption issue itself and the status of TI. As and INGO, TI does not have the 
power to impose conditionality onto governments so that they clean themselves. However, TI can 
indirectly bring about policy change as it incorporates the channels that might facilitate change in its 
strategies and activities. Through its advocacy and idea seeding, TI reflects the ideational impact of 
international integration in the capacity of a change agent. It should be noted that TI is different from 
other advocacy networks, which “seek ways to bring issues to the public agenda by framing them in 
innovative ways” 166 and “by promoting change by reporting facts”167 because it is not easy to report 
facts on corruption. Unlike the policy issues of environment or human rights, all parties involved in 
corruption have the incentive to hide it. Thus, an INGO like TI can only implant the anti-corruption 
ideas through spreading the perception of corruption, not by finding hard facts and evidence on 
specific corruption cases. Also, because it is difficult to fight individuals’ corrupt behaviors, which are 
not only covert but also disperse, TI’s approach is not bottom-up like other activist networks, which 
might challenge traditional notion of sovereignty, but is top-down instead, involving the elite and 
leaders and aiming at changing the corrupt structures.168 The policy change brought about by TI 
(though difficult to quantify) is therefore likely to be through the anti-corruption ideas that might lead 
to changes towards less corrupt structures via policy making, not through large social movements that 
reduce the number of corrupt behaviors. 
In short, TI’s strategies in raising awareness of corruption reflect the forces of ideational impact of 
international integration on policy making in a proactive manner. TI’s impact can be a proxy to 
measure the issue-perception-driven change of international integration, confirming the hypothesis 
that international integration changes the way a public policy issue is perceived – as being in 
interconnection with other policy issues, thus generating changes in policy making.  
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The hypotheses on the channels of policy change by TI via policy learning by policy makers and via 
participation in policy making of other actors in the policy community will be tested in the next 
sections.  
Policy-maker-driven change 
TI’s influence on policy makers in anti-corruption policy making is through both indirect and direct 
channels. The indirect influence is through the availability of policy tools that TI constructs to be at 
policy makers’ disposal to adopt or use in their anti-corruption agenda. The direct influence is through 
the activities aimed at facilitating policy learning in the policy making process. 
The indirect ideational influence of TI on anti-corruption policy makers is through the measurement of 
corruption that can be used as a policy tool. Politicians and policy makers can choose to use TI’s CPI in 
advancing their anti-corruption agenda. For example, as recapped by Andersson and Heywood (2009), 
the little improvement in the CPI of the Czech Republic (from 4.2 in 2004 to 4.3 in 2005) gave rise to 
the Czech Prime Minister promising a redoubling of efforts to combat corruption. However, it should 
be noted that how CPI is used is up to the decision of the policy makers in each country. TI has no 
control on the way countries use the CPI for their own analysis and arguments for anti-corruption 
policy making.169 Thus, TI’s indirect ideational impact is only one among numerous factors that build 
up the interconnectedness of the way policy issues are perceived. In other words, this indirect impact 
reflects a small part of the ideational impact of the internationalization process on anti-corruption 
policy making via discretionary adoption by policy makers in certain countries. 
Besides indirect impacts, TI has numerous activities directly targeted at anti-corruption policy makers. 
TI encourages governments to establish and implement effective laws, policies and anti-corruption 
programs. Its focus is on increasing the transparency and accountability of government operations. In 
its dialogues with the governments, TI stresses the fight against corruption as part of economic 
development. Also, the “politics of shame” by TI make governments sensitive to their standing on the 
CPI.170  Some governments even invite TI to prevent corruption in certain projects.171 Not only aiming 
at influencing or monitoring the attitude and behavior of government officials, TI devotes a major part 
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of its work to changing the corrupt structures. National chapters in developing countries often warn 
governments of the cost of corruption to national economic development and provide expertise on 
how to have TI’s principles of transparency and accountability incorporated into laws and 
regulations.172  
TI’s strategy in direct involvement with policy makers reflects the ideational impact of international 
integration on anti-corruption policy making at a purposefully accelerated pace. In other words, TI’s 
strategies are in line with the natural course of impact that international integration would have on 
anti-corruption policy making, though the difference between the natural course of impact and TI’s 
proactive plan of impact is that TI’s impact is planned and focused. 
In the international integration process, policy issues become more and more related, thus policy 
makers need to consider issues from different angles. They also have the opportunities to learn from 
international experience in dealing with these fused issues. As a closed economy opens up to the 
world, the interactions with other countries give rise to many economic opportunities, which in turn 
become incentives for corrupt behaviors of government officials and businesses involved if the anti-
corruption institutions are not yet in place. However, the now openness of the country also allows 
more exchange of information with the outside world, thus it is difficult to block information and the 
damages of corruption can no longer be covered up to preserve the image of the government as 
perceived by the people and international community. The government then faces the incentive to 
deal with corruption to preserve its legitimacy. Its policy makers can utilize the latecomer advantage 
by learning from the international experience and incorporate policy learning into policy making. This 
process is again facilitated by the increasing linkage with the world as the country becomes more and 
more open. 
TI’s strategies seem to follow the rule of the natural course of international integration impact, but 
with focus and thus accelerated pace. Instead of letting the public gradually become aware of the issue 
of corruption as more and more economic activities are created in the previously closed system, TI 
creates a movement to enhance awareness of corruption. Instead of waiting for governments to 
recognize the problem, TI alerts them of the costs of corruption to national economic development. 
Instead of waiting for the policy makers to seek experience and knowledge in anti-corruption 
strategies from international sources (perhaps via inefficient study tours abroad as a form of disguised 
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corruption), TI provides experts to instill idea inputs in the policy making process so that the 
transparency and accountability principles are incorporated into laws and regulations. 
The impact of TI activities shows that governments can absorb the new ideas (more anti-corruption 
strategies) via policy learning through interactions with this INGO. The impact of TI’s activities on policy 
learning by policy makers in anti-corruption policy making confirms the hypothesis on policy-maker-
driven change of international integration – that ideational impact of international integration on 
policy making materializes through the policy learning by policy makers. 
Policy-community-driven change 
Towards the goal of building broad coalitions against corruption, TI has been establishing links among 
international organizations, national governments, NGOs, and companies, and mobilizing domestic 
actors to fight corruption through TI national chapters. Anti-corruption programs that are generally 
collaboratively run by the World Bank Institute and TI bring together government, judiciary, NGOs, 
business as stakeholders in reforms. The bodies created by the programs – "National Integrity Steering 
Committee" (NISC) and its administrative supporting unit called "National Integrity Unit" then survey 
business and consumers to diagnose where corruption is taking place; help governments develop 
clearer and safer tax, customs, and procurement codes; and run workshops to train officials and 
citizens to see and prevent corruption, and programs to train journalists to use investigative journalism 
against corruption.173 TI’s national chapters bring together relevant players from government, civil 
society, business and the media to promote transparency in elections, in public administration, in 
procurement and in business. TI’s global network of chapters and contacts also use advocacy 
campaigns to lobby governments to implement anti-corruption reforms.  
TI aims at building “natural coalitions of interests”174, forming broad-based support for anticorruption 
programs. The reason for TI to be able to bring together disparate actors is that corruption cuts across 
a wide range of issues. Corruption adversely affects the protection of human rights, the enforcement 
of property rights, the development of professional standards, the protection of children against 
exploitation, and environmental protection.175 TI’s ability to show the linkage between corruption and 
other public policy issues has enabled it to encourage the participation of various actors in the policy 
community, forming coalitions of the state, civil society, and the private sector. 
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TI has had significant success in involving different actors in anti-corruption efforts. Different anti-
corruption initiatives have been started in each group of participants. For example, in the construction 
sector, TI has participated in the World Economic Forum Partnering against Corruption Initiative, in 
which over 100 major international construction and engineering companies have signed an anti-
corruption commitment based on TI’s “Business Principles for Countering Bribery.” TI has also 
developed infrastructure anti-corruption forums to form informal anti-corruption alliances between 
business associations, professional institutions, organizations, and companies with interests in the 
infrastructure, construction, and engineering sectors.176 However, TI focuses less on involving actors in 
the policy community (businesses, civil society, etc.) in the anti-corruption policy making process per 
se.177 This can be explained by TI’s approach in projecting its own image in international anti-
corruption agenda. 
TI tries to keep the image of being neutral and noninterventionist. It is sensitive to developing 
countries’ suspicion and hostility toward foreign imposition.178 It is interesting to note that one of the 
reasons for the formation of TI was that its founder was frustrated by the World Bank’s unwillingness 
to tackle corruption by being involved in member governments’ political affairs and then after TI has 
come into being, it now finds it not at all easy to continue its work if it is seen as being involved in 
countries’ political affairs.  
According to Galtung (2000), from witnessing corruption in development work, Peter Eigen, then the 
World Bank (WB) regional director for East Africa, began to support the idea that corruption had to be 
tackled so that there can be meaningful and sustainable development in a meeting in Swaziland in 
1990 among WB representatives stationed in Africa. WB representatives and political leaders in Africa 
agreed that it was high time an anti-corruption agenda (improving governance as a condition for 
economic development) be developed within WB. However, the WB’s headquarters was not 
persuaded. WB’s legal department referred to WB’s articles of confederation which prohibits WB from 
being involved in a member government’s political affairs and claimed that corruption was therefore 
beyond WB’s mandate. “Frustrated by the Bank’s unwillingness to change from within, Eigen took 
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early retirement and set out on an arduous odyssey to concretize the anticorruption concepts floated 
in Swaziland.”179 TI was then founded by the collaboration of groups and individuals with the same 
commitment to the anti-corruption cause.180 
In many countries, corruption has been used by political oppositions to challenge incumbent 
governments.181 TI builds national, regional, and global coalitions that embrace the state, civil society, 
and the private sector to fight domestic and international corruption; and coordinate and support 
national chapters to implement this mission.182 However, TI does not focus on bringing about policy 
change through assisting domestic political contestation. Although TI was founded upon the public 
value of the issue (the commitment to the fight against corruption), it is still affected by its identity as 
“international”, thus it might face the risk of being seen as not truly belonging to the localities it works 
in. The national chapters of TI are independent, self-financed and develop and implement their own 
programs, but they are connected to one another. National chapters in developed countries often 
provide assistance in the establishment of national chapters in developing countries. 183 Various other 
interactions within the TI movement make it “international”, yet also pose the risk of it being seen as 
“foreign”. It is therefore not surprising that TI tries to keep its neutrality image to avoid possible 
hostility of host countries. TI would not be able to bring about policy change if it were seen as the 
Trojan horse who tries to bell the cat.184 TI’s role as a policy broker/policy community mediator would 
be more appropriate. 
In short, through its interactions with policy makers and other actors in the policy community, TI has 
shown that while it has not been the source of change, it has been an important agent of change 
through the work of an elite transnational advocacy network. TI’s success in three aspects (1) raising 
awareness about the damaging effects of corruption and advocating policy reform and the 
implementation of multilateral conventions, (2) facilitating policy learning by policy makers in anti-
corruption policy making, and (3) involving actors in policy community in anti-corruption efforts 
                                                          
179
 Galtung (2000), p.23 
180
 It should be noted that as TI takes the form of an INGO, it needs to develop its own organizational principles and 
guidelines. Its ethical framework in turn might restrict its activities in the way WB’s articles of confederation seem to have 
restricted its options. Further research on TI’s identity and organizational form on the policy change it can bring is thus 
promising of yielding interesting results.  
181
 Wang and Rosenau (2001), p.27 
182
 Galtung (2000), p.26 
183
 Wang and Rosenau (2001), p. 32 
184
 The expression is borrowed from Paul, Samuel (1997), “Who Will Bell the Cat?”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.32, 
No.23 - Jun. 7-13, 1997, pp. 1350-1355 
119 
 
(though not much in anti-corruption policy making per se) reflect the three sources of policy change 
that come from international integration via INGOs. 
Note 
In this appendix, I focus on using TI (as a case of INGOs) as a proxy for the international integration 
process (methodology-driven research), but not much as a component of the international integration 
process (content-driven research). For a full understanding of the impact of international integration 
on anti-corruption policy making, it is necessary to look into INGOs as a component of that process, 
together with other components, such as international organizations such as IMF and WB, the 
networks among governments and among actors in the policy community, for example the local civil 
society in issues not directly labeled anti-corruption, the epistemic/knowledge-based community, 
international laws, the UN, etc. 
Many further research questions need to be explored for an in-depth understanding of the impact of 
international integration on anti-corruption policy making in developing and transitional countries. 
Apart from the approach that views international integration as a natural process that affect all 
countries or certain groups of countries, international integration might also be viewed as a policy 
choice of developing and transitional countries as they open up their economies and follow 
international standards. Apart from anti-corruption policy making, it might be useful to develop a 
framework on anti-corruption actions by non-state actors in policy community that are not directly 
linked to the process of anti-corruption policy making, but might have indirect impact on anti-
corruption efforts at local, national and international levels. 
